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INTRODUCTION 
Independence and freedom are magic words in Africa 
today, and they have been the primary objectives of 
nationalist leaders in colonial areas for more than a 
generation. To the African, whether he resides in 
Biafra, Angola, or Rhodesia, independence and freedom 
signify dignity, position in the world, and new oppor-
tunities for social development and economic growth. 
For centuries Westerners have referred to Africa 
as the Dark Continent. This has not been a reference to 
Africans as black people, but, rather, a realization of 
the West that little was known about the African continent, 
its history or people, not to mention its great achieve-
ments and civilizations. Westerners had never heard of 
Zimbabwe or known the ancient glory of the kingdoms of 
Mali, Ghana, or Axum. Exploration and the slave trade 
and translations from Arab historians and geographers 
were responsible for the initial Western interest in the 
continent. 
Africa, in spite of all we know about it, remains 
dark to the non-African world, and this is truly unfor-
tunate at a time when the "eyes" of the world look to 
Africa for political support and economic resources. 
i 
Man's inhumanity to man seldom has been exhibited anywhere 
on Earth as on the Dark Continent. How long is it des-
tined to remain dark to the eyes of the governments of 
the world? 
Western colonial powers have had a tremendous 
opportunity to bridge the gap between the West and Africa, 
and, indeed, there have been great material achievements 
that benefited both the colonies and the colonial powers. 
However, the intellectual trust that should exist natur-
ally between all human beings has been almost totally 
absent. Herein lies the crux of the problem existent now, 
as in the past, between Africa and the world. 
Since World War II, thirty-eight African nations 
have gained their independence, at the expense of Great 
Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium. These nations 
emerged with representative governments. Of these thirty-
eight nations, however, few have retained their representa-
tive democratic structure, most having become highly 
centralized and antagonistic to the Western democracies. 
This centralized structure is of concern to the 
West, since the failure of Western colonial policies and 
the political breakdown that ensues may lead to another 
kind of colonialism. For these reasons then, more must 
be learned concerning the people and how they perceive 
their national destinies. Then, the West must aid in 
ii 
their achievement. Only then can the West feel it under-
stands its burden to the emerging nations. 
Portugal has the largest empire remaining in 
Africa. Portugal's history there dates to the Colwnbian 
period, and its government boasts that a colonial phi-
losophy different from the other colonial powers in Africa 
is at work. The Portuguese speak of a "civilizing 
mission," "cultural assimilation, 11 and the "Lusitaniza.-
tionn of its colonies. The determination of Portugal to 
see its policies through and the determination of 
Angolan nationalists to exact independence and freedom 
from the Portuguese warrant an investigation of the cur-
rent revolution and the basis of Angolan nationalism. 
If the colonial powers in Africa had been cogni-
zant of their responsibility to their dependencies, 
would their policies have been altered to avert up-
heaval and disaster? Would the F'rench government have 
followed its traditional colonial policies and sacrificed 
thousands of lives in Algeria, only to lose it? Would 
Great Britain risk another Mau-Mau uprising for the sake 
of preserving British property holdings in Kenya, only 
to lose them? If these "enlightened" coloniel policies 
had recognized the danger signals and taken positive 
action, perhaps the African block would be more 
iii 
receptive to Western ideology and policy. Or, is there 
a larger problem? Are the colonies so indispensable to 
the welfare of the mother country, for example, Angola to 
Portugal, that the Portuguese government will fight to 
the end to retain its empire? 
In th i_ s world of change, ideas and policies must 
be constantly evaluated to encompass the real; reactionary 
policies can only court disaster. An understanding of 
the past can provide insight into the present and offer 
guidelines for future action. An investigation of Angola 
has exposed great weaknesses in Portuguese colonial 
organization that must be altered. The naming of Premier 
Marcello Caetano to replace the ailing President Antonio 
Salazar may permit movement in this direction. 
The preservation of Africa to permit Africans to 
develop their cultures and traditions and to develop 
pride in past achievements must be recognized by both East 
and West. Both the communist countries and the Western 
democracies look at Africa with a serious political 
myopia. Africa cannot be expected to develop as pro-
west or pro-communist but must be permitted to develop 
as pro-African. 
Africans were dispossessed so ci.:dly, economically, 
politically, and mentally by colonialism. With the loss 
iv 
of their homelands came enslavement, persecution, an 
inferior status, discrimination, and dependency, in vol v-
ing the loss of freedom and dignity. A neo-colonialism 
is not the answer to Africa's problems. 
All peoples have a right to freedom and dignity. 
This must be restored to Africa and to the Angolan 
peoples if these natjons are to assmne responsible 
positions in the world community. 
This paper examines the divergent rolls of both 
Portugal and Angola in this quest. 
v 
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CHAPTER I 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA 
A. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ANGOLA 
Angola lies between 4°22'S and 1S003'S in latitude 
and between 24005,E.G. and 11041 1 E.G. in longitude on the 
southwest Atlantic coast of Africa. Its area of 481,351 
square miles includes the enclave of Cabinda, located 
north of the Congo River and separated from Angola by a 
twenty-mile-wide corridor of land. Angola is bordered 
by the Democratic Republic of the Congo--Kinshasa--on the 
north; on the east by Zambia; and on the south by the 
Trust Territory of Southwest Africa. North of Cabinda 
lies the Congo Republic--Brazzaville (see Map 1). The 
name "Angola" is a Portuguese corrupt ion of the word 
11ngola," meaning chief. 
Angola is, in a geographical sense, a transi-
tional country. In the north are equatorial forests and 
grasslands, and the marshes of the Congo with their 
luxuriant verdure and torpid heat; in the south, the 
semi-arid plains and harsh desert east of the Mossamedes 
littoral. The coast is fringed by a plain which in the 
north has a width of 150 miles or more but narrows until 
1 
-
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it practically disappears near 170 south latitude. 
Behind this coastal plain, the land rises in steep 
escarpments to the plateau. This vast plateau covers 
most of the country. North from Lobito the climate is 
tropical. South of this city, the cold Benguela current 
influences the environment; temperatures are cooler with 
diurnal and annual changes less extreme. 
In general, the plateau is adequately watered, 
averaging 59 inches of precipitation annually. The most 
"' productive area in this tableland region is the Bie 
Plateau, Angola's loftiest agricultural region and most 
import ant watershed. (See Map 2.) 
B. DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF ANGOLA 
In 1960, the last year of an official census, the 
population of Angola was 4,832,677, of which just under 
200,000 were white.l Latest statistics, however, esti-
mated that in 1965 the total population rose to 5,215,000, 
of which 210,000 were white or mestizo.2 
lnThe Angolan War " Portuguese and Colonial 
Bulletin, Vol. I, No. 12 (February-March, 1962), p. 69. 
2"White Outposts in Southern Africa," Editorial 
Research Reports, Vol. II, No. 17 (November 2, 1966), p. 815. 
3 
Its inhabitants consist of numerous tribes with 
long histories of separateness in their cultural 
heritage and lines of authority. The great majority of 
the native peoples of Angola are of Bantu-Negro stock, 
and only a small minority are non-Bantu Negroes. In 
the south there are some Hottentots and Bushmen. In 
Angola the term Negro is generally used to designate 
the entire indigenous population of the country, while 
the term Bantu designates those peoples who have migrated 
over the centuries into the Congo Basin from an area 
between Lake Tschad and the Upper Nile. The most 
important tribes are the Kimbundu, who live in a 
rectangular area inland from Luanda and eastward, and 
the Ovimbundu, who occupy the Benguela Highland in central 
Angola (see Map J). These two groups comprise more than 
one-half the total population, and it is difficult to 
envision effective political control of an independent 
Angola without the support of these two groups. The 
Kikongos, who live in the Portuguese Congo, are politi-
cal! y, culturally, and historically 1 inked to the 
Bakongos of the Congo-Kinshasa.3 
3Thomas Okuma, Angola in Ferment (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1962~ p. 19. 
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The most important group south of the Kikongo 
tribe to reside in and around Luanda, the capital, and east 
to Malange are the Kimbundu peoples. Urban city life has 
affected greatly the outlook and aspirations of these 
people; they are more influenced by Western ideals than 
other tribal eroups, speak fluent Portuguese, have many 
students in the "liceus,n and are, therefore, more tied to 
the economy and the political ideals of the Portuguese than 
are other tribes.4 The Ovimbundu, who are located in the 
central plateau area east of the Kimbundu, are the 
largest group in Angola but are politically somewhat less 
vocal, probably because of their geot:;raphical isolation 
fro111 the m2in current of politic.el thought which centers 
itself in the populous areas. The Cuanham2s, who live in 
southern An;:;ola, c:..re semi-nomadic cattle raisers, and, 
because of their isolation from major population centers, 
have been somewhat insulated from the ntide 11 of nation2lism 
that has influenced many Angolans. Independence, to the 
Cuanh2nc:s, me2.ns a return to political freedom which pre-
dates the period of Portuzuese authority over their politi-
cal destinies. The Cuanhamas hc::ve not identified with 
otter nationalist groups. In the northeast corner of the 
4okurna, 2.£· cit., p. 19. 
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country are the Lunda people, considered one of the most 
"primitive" groups in Angola and only recently active 
participants in the struggle for independence from Portugal. 
Also less influenced by nationalism are the Nganguela, 
located in the southwest section of the country. In spite 
of the apparent differences in nationalistic fervor between 
these people, the tribal leadership appear quite knowledge-
able about one another's political aspirations. 
When the colonial powers divided the African conti-
nent at the end of the nineteenth century, many tribes were 
sub-divided by artificial political boundaries. In Angola 
this "geographic" separation of tribes created ethnographic 
regions not oriented to an Angolan state. Current tribal 
populations are, therefore, only a part of a larger tribal 
grouping (see Table I). 
TABLE r5 
Population of Ethnic Groups in Angola 
Ethnic Group 
Kikongo 
Kimbundu 
Ovimbundu 
Lunda-Chokwe 
Nganguela 
Nyaneka-Humbe 
Ambo-Cuc:mhama 
Herrero 
Population (Est. 1965) 
500,000 
1,100,000 
1,500,000 
3 60 '000 
330,000 
200,000 
63 '000 
25,000 
5Ronald H. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 56-58. 
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The description of the major tribal groupings 
indicates the great diversity that exists within the 
country and points to the obvious fact that the politjcal 
boundaries of Angola bear little relationship to the 
ethnographic or physical makeup of the country. Ethnic 
groups are many, and tribal boundaries are only loosely 
related to political boundaries. For example, the 
Kikongo people overlap territorial borders and populate 
large districts in the two Congo republics. The Cuanhama 
people of southern Angola are a part of the larger Ambo 
tribe of Southwest Africa. 
The physical boundaries of Angola further 
complicate the 11 solidarity11 of an Angolan state, since 
the physical limits of the country are often rivers or 
other features that enhance movement rather than pro-
vide a barrier to it. The Congo, Kwango, Kasai, Kwando, 
Cubango, and Cunene Rivers make up over 1000 miles of 
border between Angola and neighboring countries, and 
river routes have always been avenues of movement and 
communication, transmitting cultural ideas and enhancing 
the movement of peoples. The relative absence of physical 
barriers should now aid in linking the corners of Angola 
politically and economically. Inter-tribal warfare has 
ceased, and the common bond of nationalism is now possible. 
7 
Internal and external forces are bringing these tribal 
groups closer together; even though considerable differ-
ences separate them, the common link of cultural 
homogeneity exists to serve as a bonding agent for future 
political enlightenment.6 
C. THE ECONOMY OF ANGOLA 
The most important single aspect of Angola's 
economy is its tremendous potential. This lends some 
insight into Angola's present economic condition--a state 
of underdevelopment. In spite of this condition, the 
country has undergone tremendous economic change in the 
past few years--both in industrial and agricultural 
investment. The enormous economic potential rests with 
the under-exploited mineral resources and the under-
development of arable land. However, a rather primitive 
communications system and a general lack of cooperation 
between the white population and the Africans hinder the 
development of these resources. 
Agriculture is the chief occupation in Angola, 
but methods of cultivation are mainly primitive. 
6Jan M. Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 19. 
The Angolan sub-soil is rich in natural resources, 
especially mineral deposits. The value of these resources 
is undetermined, since only in recent years have explora-
tion and exploitation been undertaken. Limited financial 
resources and a reluctance to permit extensive foreign 
investment also retarded the development of Angola's sub-
soil resources (until after 1961). The present development 
of mineral resources is politically motivated. With great 
amounts of foreign capital invested in Angola, the 
Portuguese government is banking on foreign political 
support to protect these financial interests, a modern-day 
example of "dollar diplomacy." Also, through economic 
development the Portuguese government is able to reduce 
the influence of revolutionary leaders who use the existent 
substandard economic system as evidence of Portuguese 
inability and corruption. Portugal, however, does not 
possess the financial resources to carry on a large-scale 
economic development without permitting huge foreign 
capital investment. 
The 1961 revolt made it clear to President Salazar 
that economic policies in Angola were in need of revision. 
The economic plight of the Angolan citizen had to be eased 
if his allegiance was to be maintained, and Angola's 
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economic base had to be expanded to help pay for increased 
military expenditures if Portugal was to remain in Africa. 
Foreign capital investment provided a partial answer. 
The Alfred Krupp Corporation of Germany and the 
Kowasaki Steel Corporation of Japan invested in the steel 
industry.7 The Belgian firm Petrangel8 and the American 
Gulf Oil Company explored and located large oil deposits.9 
The development of basic industries attracted investment 
in the secondary industries. The General Motors Corporation, 
General Tire Company, Soci~te Pechiney, Berliot Tractor 
Company, Petrofina Belge, Krupp, and Opel were among the 
investors in Angolan manufacturing industries.10 Signifi-
cant investments in the coffee and diamond industries also 
increased production, thereby helping to ease Portugal's 
financial drain. 
?"Colonial Struggle," Portuguese and Colonial 
Bulletin, Vol. VI, No. 4 (August-September, 1966), p. 342. 
"Colonial Struggle," Portuguese and Colonial 
Bulletin, Vol. V. No. 6 (December, 1965-January, 1966), 
p. 306. 
SttNew Oil Strike?" Africa Report, Vol. XI, No. 7 
(October, 1966), p. 42. 
9 110il Find in Cabinda," African Recorder, Vol. VI, 
No. 1 (January 1-14, 1967), p. 1528. 
10 11Portuguese Africa 11 American Opinion Review, 
Vol. VII, No. 7 (July-August: 1964), p. 8. 
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The above data are important to illustrate the 
dependence of Portugal on Angola if a favorable balance 
of trade and a balanced budget are to be maintained. The 
increased military expenditures necessitated by the revolu-
tion which began in 1961 have only increased Portuguese 
dependence on the Angolan economy. 
The interdependence of the Portuguese and Angolan 
economies is evident, and the relationship of the two is 
inextricably wrapped up in the internal problems of 
Fortu6al. Portugal, in addition, is short of capital. Her 
industries in Angola as well as in Europe are owned and run 
by foreign industrial or investment firms. Most of the 
vital sectors of the economy are dominated by British, 
French, and Belgian capital with great increases in 
American and German investments in recent years. There 
has been, in general, a lack of educational opportunity in 
both Portugal and Angola. As a result the population does 
not possess the technical skills necessary to overcome 
foreign dominance. Angolans and Fortu0uese alike are thus 
placed in a position of subservience and must rely upon 
outside technical aid. In short, Portugal is not in a 
position to give economic aid to Angola without foreign 
intrusion. 
The object of Portugal's economic policy seems 
clear--to influence large companies to invest heavily, to 
11 
derive increased revenue by sharing in the profits of 
these enterprises, and, in the event of an African up-
rising, count on these firms to mobilize public opinion 
on her behalf in their respective countries. 
The economic future of Angola is one of promise. 
Hindering this development is the economic backwardness 
of Portugal, itself an economic colony. 
D. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ANGOLAN HISTORY 
Portugal's contemporary problems in Angola are 
linked to the great exploits of the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries, a century after the Bantu migrated to 
the Congo Basin. From this early period, Portuguese 
history has been bound to Africa and to the great Lusitanian 
exploits of the past. Portuguese manifest destiny owes its 
conception to the ambitions of Prince Henry, "the 
Navigator.n Prince Henry was motivated by a five-fold 
purpose: to explore the unknown African coastline south 
of Cape Bojador; to link Portugal commercially with any 
Christian nations discovered; to determine whether 
Mohammedan traders were influential in this unknown part 
of Africa; to seek Christian allies; and to win Christian 
converts •11 (See Map 4. ) 
llchilcote, 212.· cit., p. 3. 
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More significant than his accomplishments were 
two ideas which, once in motion, caught the imagination 
of the Portuguese and became responsible for what is now 
termed the Portuguese "mind"--the economic integration of 
overseas enclaves with Portut;al, and the conversion of the 
native population to Christianity. 
The visit of Diogo cio to the Congo River in 1484 
marked the initial attempt of Portuguese explorers to 
carry out the "civilizing mission" of the mother country 
as envisioned by Prince Henry. On this voyage he carried 
gifts to the Kongo chieftain King Nzinga-a-Cuum and 
implored him to embrace the Christian faith. This early 
venture established a peaceful relationship between the 
Manicongo and Portugal; the Portuguese motivation was 
"to evangelize and in a sense nationalize, to seek alli-
ance, not conquest.nl2 From 1506-1512, strone; ties were 
established between Kongo and Portugal. 
Alfonso, who replaced Nzinga-a-Cuum upon his 
death in 1506, asked for and got priests, teachers, 
masons, and technicians to help with military matters; 
he also sent Kongolese to Portue;al for their education, 
12James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 11. 
13 
in return supplying gifts of slaves and copper.13 By 1510 
the Portuguese had established themselves as superior to 
the Kongolese and racial harmony was, in general, absent. 
Alfonso requested that King Manuel send a representative to 
the Kongo with special jurisdiction over the Portuguese 
citizens to help reestablish equality between the races. 
In response, King Manuel issued a "regimento," which was 
the codification of a program of Christianization and 
Lusi tanization. This document, unique for its time, w2s 
a blueprint for the acculturation of the native popula-
tion .14 
Ironically, then, the cultur2l assimilation of the 
population beg2n at the request of Alfonso, an African, 
still the most revered political figure in Angolan history. 
The regimento failed to achieve its purpose even 
though its implementation bec2,me the focal point of 
colonial policy. Its failure was due mainly to the 
undisciplined Portuguese colonials and t,overnment officials 
in carrying out the intent of the program.15 The kingdom 
13vans1·na on c·t 4° 
' ~. _1_. ' p • c • 
14Ibid. 
15Duffy, 2.E.· cit., p. 16. 
14 
of Alfonso, after 1522, declined in importance as Portuguese 
attention shifted to Sao Tome, an island fast becoming 
prosperous as an entrepot for the slave trade. 
Angola's rise to prominence, though partially a 
natural consequence of Portuguese expansion below the 
equator, was stimulated by several conditions in the six-
teenth century. Sao Tome needed to tap a rich new area to 
keep pace with the demand for sl2ves, and the Guinea trade 
could not produce them in sufficient numbers. Attention 
focused southward toward Angola because the "ngola" wanted 
to please his European friends by opening the slave trade.16 
As a result Portuguese occupation shifted to Angola and 
Benguela. A militant policy which charged Paulo Dias de 
Novais with conquering and colonizing Angola was adopted 
in 1575. Its prime purpose was to conquer and colonize 
the coastal and interior regions. Its ultimate objectives 
were the acquisition of land for European settlement, the 
expansion of the slave trade, and the discovery and control 
of mineral wealth, especially the silver mines believed to 
exjst in the interior.17 
The Angola chief had wanted contact with Portugal 
since 1519, probably because the slave tr~de would enrich 
16Duffy, ibid., p. 137. 
17Chilcote, .£I> cit., p. 66. 
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him and heighten his prestige. To tighten its hold over 
Angol2, Portugal expanded its infl-uence into the interior 
regions. Wars of TTpacification" were fought with native 
tribes, and white Portuguese were encouraged to settle in 
Africa. The conquest of the interior began in 1575, and, in 
a series of wars lasting forty years, the Portuguese and the 
Angol2ns were able to control this region. The subsequent 
linking of Angola to Portugal by a treaty signed in 1656 
ushered in the miseries of the slave trade which were to 
continue until the last ouarter of the nineteenth century. 
The Portuguese were persistent in their efforts 
to convert the native population to Christianity and 
Western culture. After the advent of the slave trade into 
Angola; however, with slavery the main Portuguese pre-
occupation, force became the principal method of persua-
sion.18 The ultimate goals of Portuguese occupation and 
settlement were to achieve cultural integration with the 
Angolan population, to relieve internal Portuguese problems 
of overpopulation and economic poverty, and to establish 
political superiority over a larger geographical area.19 
lSchilcote, .212· cit., p. 7. 
19Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
16 
The slave trade by its very nature destroyed any 
humenizinc; attempts by the Portuguese. Having solely a 
materialistic purpose, the slave trade constituted the 
greatest contradiction in Lusitanian policy. It denied 
equality of the races and implicitly implied that the 
Angolan was inferior, thus destroying any meaningful 
assimilation. As one missionary stated, "At the side 
of the missionary who carried salvation, TT Father Barroso 
lamented, "was the buyer of men who destroyed the ties 
linking father to son and mother to daughter. 11 20 For over 
two hundred years the inferior status of the native was 
perpetuated by the slave trade. 
By official decree the slave trade was abolished 
in lb7E, and, as would be expected, was met with a response 
demanding its continuance for "humanitarian 11 reasons. 
. . • and should the measure be strictly 
enforced, the total annihilation and ruin of 
the thriving and rising cotton and sugarcane 
plantations, etc., will be the result ...• 
It is a pity that philanthropy should 
blindly put so sudden a stop to a custom that 
has existed from time immemorial, and of which 
the evils are, in a country like Angola, 
exceedingly slight. The effect of this measure 
will be to destroy its nascent industry, the 
20Quote of Father Barroso, Duffy,.££· cit., p. 23. 
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only means for its progress and development, and 
will plunge a great part of its population into 
helpless misery for years to come. Let slavery 
be abolished by all means, but only in the most 
gradual manner, and in proportion to the indus-
trial and moral advanc ernen t of the race. 21 
This statement again reiterates confic.ence in the 
idea of the acculturation of the native, even though it 
met failure in the Kongo and had been partially abandoned 
in Angola. 
It was apparent by the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century that competition for the interior regions 
of Africa would become intense; with no internal frontiers 
all Africa inland from the coasts was considered to be, 
like America in the time of Columbus, without government 
and subject to the jurisdiction of whoever 2rrived first. 
The Portuguese government aspired to consolidate inland 
holdings by joining the colonies of Angola and Mozambique, 
creating a trans-African empire. 
In response to the competition for African terri-
tory, Bismarck called a conference in Berlin in 1885 to 
submit the African problem to international regulation. 
This conference attempted to dr&ft an international code 
to govern the way in which European powers wishing to 
21Joachim J. Monteiro, Angola and the River CongQ. 
(London: Macmillan and Compe.ny, 1875), Vol. II, p. 41. 
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acquire African territory should proceect.22 The con-
f erence determined that a European power with holdines on 
the coast had prior rights in the TTback" country. 
Occupation could not be on paper only, however, but had 
to consist of real occupation by administrators or 
troops, each power giving proper notice as to the terri-
tories it considered its own. 
A wild scramble for "real occupation 11 quickly 
followed. The Portuguese annexed huge domains to Angola, 
with the intent of legitimizing its claim. Portugal was 
able to retain control over Angola partially because 
Germany, Great Britain, and France preferred to have 
this territory held by a minor power rather than bv one 
of their significant rivals.23 
The period following 1900 provided Portugal 11i th 
a second opportunity to revit2lize its age-old colonial 
policy, since it wes not until the period from 1900 to 
1914 that the interior Angolan tribes were put under 
effective Portuguese administrative control. For the 
first time in Portuguese history, however, probably 
because of competition for territory with other powers, 
22sybil Eyre Crowe, The Berlin West Africa Con-
ference (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1942), p:-rgu.-
23Ibid., pp. 169-172. 
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the extension of Portuguese influence brought with it a 
tot2l loss of native independence. 
With the loss of independence and the absorption 
of control by Portuguese authorities, certain benefits 
accrued to the native population. Tribal sl~ve trading 
was halted and the depopulation of tribes ended. The 
Portueuese government introduced legitimate commerce into 
the interior regions for the first time and established 
the ini tiel rudiments of formalized education. With 
tribal peace assured, disenses were effectively combatted, 
and roads linked the interior to the coast.24 
Tvvhen the Oliviera Salazar regime took over in the 
late twenties, the "civilizing mission" and economic ex-
ploitation continued to dominate colonial policy. For a 
time empires were fashionable, and Portuguese spokesmen 
during the thirties did not shrink fran boasting that the 
colonies existed for the glory and profit of Portugal. 
After World War II, however, such policies ceased to be a 
source of respectability, but the economic objectives of 
Portuguese policy in Africa remeined unchant~ed: cheap 
24w. E. Abreham, The Mind of Africa (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 118. 
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labor, lucrative markets, and the exploitation of raw 
material resources. 
Significant in the historical relationship between 
Angola and Portugal was the declaration in 1951 that 
Angola's status had been changed from a colony to that of 
an overseas territory, thus becoming an integral part of 
Portugal itself. This change in relationship brought no 
noticeable change to Angola, however. Following World 
War II Angolans were aware that the war had brought 
independence to many colonial areas. 
African nationalism began to evolve in the 
Portuguese territories in the late 1940's and 
early 1950's; not until the early 1960 1 s, 
hmvever, did nationalism serve as the impetus 
for direct action and struggle for independence.25 
At what point in Angolan history did revolt against 
Portugal become inevitable? What was the last real oppor-
tunity President Salazar had to save a portion of the 
Lusitanian mission? It seems clear that the political dis-
ruption after World War II should have provided the impetus. 
The war had meant economic paralysis and political stagna-
tion to the Portuguese colonies. After World War II, the 
British 12,bour government c;,dvocated emancipation of the 
colonies and set the political machinery in motion. There 
was no sense of urgency in Portugal! In addition, World 
25chilcote, .212.· cit., p. L~9. 
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War II was a struge:;le 2gainst fascism and its anti-liberal, 
an ti-parl iament2rian, an ti-democratic striJ.ctur e, which 
Salazar represented to much of the world. The war had 
germinated idea.s against such a political structure and 
identified it as tyranny. 
President Salazar did not heed the warnings. 
Instead, there was a reaffirmation of Portugal's colonial 
policy, essentially the same policy that dates to the age 
of Prince Henry. The vision of a Pan-Lusitanian community 
still inspires Portugal. Luso-Africans and Luso-Asians 
are to be joined together by a special bond: the loyalty 
born of miscegenation. This loyalty, it is clsbned, is 
able to override all others. 11 0ne State, One Race, One 
?aith, and One Civilizationn--these are the bonds that 
unite an empire. This has become, despite its agelessness, 
a part of the new mystique. 
Speaking at the Colonial Governor's Conference in 
1933, Salazar declared: 'I have in mind now the 
great old figures of Portuguese colonization. 
'I']-iey pass back and forth in my memory, these men 
of yesterday and those of today, the soldiers and 
administrators of 6the public trust in Africa and 
the East .•.• '2 
26K. Madhu Panikkar Angola in Flames (Bombay: 
Asia Publishing House, 1962,, p. 4. 
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E. PORTUGUESE COLONIAL POLICY 
Present colonial policy has its origins in the 
past, and has been justified on both moral and legal 
grounds. The outlines of colonial policy were clearly 
established during the period of expansion and coloniza-
tion with the political objective being to control parts 
of Africe and other areas and to weld these areas into 
an empire based on friendly alliances. The economic 
objective was the dominance of international markets by 
controlling a network of key commercial centers. Another 
objective was the evane;elization and Lusitanization of 
the uncivilized peoples and the instilling of European 
culture into the indigenous Africans' cultural values. 
The latter objective, the t1 civilizing mission, 11 is of 
paramount importance to present Portuguese governmental 
philosophy. 
This policy asswnes, by the acculturation or 
assimilation of the indigenous population, the superiority 
of western culture, and, more specifically, Portuguese 
culture. 
Portuguese attention is focused on native policy, 
which in theory favors assimilation of the African. Educa-
tion is the vehicle by which integration is to be achieved. 
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According to Portuguese theoreticians like 
Joaquim de Silva Cunha, the policy of assimilation 
meant essentially that all inhabitants of the 
colonial territories, whether white or black 
and irrespective of their level of cultural 
development, must be regarded as equal in all 
respects and subject to the laws of the mother 
country. A policy of assimilation is founded on 
the idea that there are no essential differences 
between the races. In essence, all men are 
equal. . • • 27 
A multiracial society based on Portuguese citizenship with 
its concomitant integrated structure is to be the result of 
the colonial policy. 
Today, as in the past, the qualified African may 
attain, if he chooses, full Portuguese citizenship and 
attain the status of the civilized non-indigenous popula-
tion. The standards are difficult and are stringently 
applied. Applicants must be at least eighteen years of 
age, be of good character, and possess those qualities 
necessary to exercise all the rights granted to the 
Portuguese citizen. He must speak Portuguese well and 
prove his ability to support himself and his family. 
Anyone who has evaded military service or has been 
declared a deserter is ineligible for assimilation.28 
27chilcote, 2.E.· cit., p. 16. 
28nuffy, op. cit., p. 295. 
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Thus, the end result of colonial policy is to 
assimilate all indigenous Africans into a harmonious 
multiracial society. This multiracial society is not 
the mere coexistence of different racial or ethnic groups, 
but is, rather, a society where all ethnic groups are 
closely integrated and knit together with a deep feeling 
of oneness.29 "Full citizenship," as conceived by 
President Salazar, should be a nnoble legc:l concept," and 
the granting of civil rights should correspond to a 
genuine and lasting evolution, or else the peoples run 
the risk of regression and a return to tribalism. 
'A law recognizing citizenship takes minutes to 
draft and can be made right away,' he said. 'A 
citizen, that is a man fully and consciously 
integrated into a civilized political society, 
takes centuries to achieve.'30 
The question-mark concerning Portuguese colonial 
policy does not lie with the stated objectives or the 
legal codes themselves, but with the extent to which they 
hold meaning for the people to whom they are designed to 
give significance. Of the present population, approximately 
29Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Foreigg Policy 
(Lisbon: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Publication, 1965), 
p. 51. 
30New York Times, May 31, 1961, Interview with 
President Oliviera Salazar, Salazar Suggests Accord with 
U.S., by Benjamin Wells, Vol. CX, No. 3774S, p. 12. 
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one per cent has achieved assimilated status, with the 
non-assimilated living under a different set of laws. 
Up to the early fifties at least, many European 
observers felt that there was a real opportunity for 
Portugal to accelerate the development of a non-racial, 
integrated society in Africa. Sorne were impressed by 
the fact that in An£ola education and economic standing 
in the community appeared not to follmv racial patterns. 
It was suggested by some observers that that would have 
been the most propitious time to widen ric;hts and 
opportunities for the indigenous population. Many 
people had hoped that steps would be taken in this 
direction. Some Africans feel, however, that there had 
never been any real racial equality or promise of racial 
equality. Authorities failed to widen rights. Assimila-
tion progressed at .e.n imperceptible rate, and hope in 
Portuguese policies waned. Angolans observed the in-
dependence of other African territories, and sovereignty 
for Angola was substituted for integration into Portuguese 
society. 
The many facets of Portuguese colonial policy 
reflect a traditional belief. The Portuguese continue 
to profess faith in the dream of a Lusitanian community 
26 
and view Angola as the key to maintaining the empire. As 
if to support this faith, the Lisbon government has failed 
to prepare the Angolan population for independence. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE BASIS OF ANGOLAN NATIONALISM 
While the great tides of African destiny sweep 
fo~~ard, Portugal clincs with forlorn but stubborn 
pride to the hopes and illusions of a bygone age. 
The memory that Portugal was the first of the 
European powers to explore the African coast and 
establish posts on African soil was recently 
brought to new life by the celebration of the 
fifth centenary of the death of Henry the Navi-
gator, a celebration deliberately aimed to drama-
tize the country's world mission. It has been the 
dream of the Portuguese that they might be, not 
the last of the powers to leave Africa, but the only 
one which would fuse its African, Asian, and 
European peoples into a single national whole, 
perhaps even--wistfully--bringing multiracial 
Brazil back into the fold.31 
A. CAUSES OF CONFLICT 
The Portuguese government has adopted the position 
that, prior to the rebellion in 1961, Angola was a land 
of peace and tranquility. The rebellion was the work of 
outside instigation. President Salazar cited the small 
security forces in Angola at the time of the revolt as 
evidence that hitherto Angola had remained calm and un-
affected by outside agitation.32 Information provided 
from sources other than the Portuguese govermnent, includ-
ing statements made before the Security Council and 
3lokurna, ££· cit., p. vii. 
32New York Times, May 31, 1961, p. 12. 
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General Assembly of the United Nations, indicate that 
for some years prior to the 1961 outbreak, there had been 
increasing unrest among local inhebitants. Open resistance 
and conflict originated with the accumulation of grievances 
in An0ola and the impact of the movement toward total 
independence of many African territories, especially the 
Republic of the Congo-Kinshasa. r·.'leasures to restrict 
contact with the outside world, displays of force, and 
the repression of Angolans suspected of political activity 
could no longer forestall continuing disturbances and 
protests. Such measures, intensified after 1961, seem 
only to have increased tension and precipitated further 
conflict and guerrilla activity. 
The grievances of the mass of the indigenous 
population of Angola were based principally upon the non-
implementation of existing statutes and the fact that 
statutes and policy implied the inferiority of the Angolan 
peoples, especially the acculturation policy. 
The policy of assimilation, proclaimed by the 
Salazar government as the most important aspect of its 
acculturation program, was not accompanied by a concerted 
effort to prepare the inhabitants for status as citizens. 
Only e. small number of Angolans have acquired citizenship 
and assumed assimilado status. The vast majority were 
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not afforded educational opportunity and were often subject 
to discrlininatory legislation. Even assimilado status 
had deteriorated somewhat since the mid-1950's, since 
there had been continuing pressure for an independent 
status for Angola rather than assimilation with Portugal. 
In addition, the vast majority of the indigenous popula-
tion had no opportunity because of their tribal status to 
participate in the administrative affairs of the territory 
or have the right of franchise. There is no doubt that 
this lack of opportunity developed a feeling of being a 
stranger in one's own country. To acquire these privi-
leges, the indigene had to adopt a way of life different 
from that of their heritage. 
Angolans also complained of the denial of human 
rights and an abuse of authority by governmental officials. 
Political arrests, prolonged periods of imprisonment with-
out trial, poor treatment of prisoners, and the disappear-
ance of prisoners help to explain the gradual spread .of 
nationalism throughout the countryside. Legal channels 
for the redress of grievances had not existed for the 
indigene. 
As the indigene became enlightened through better 
communication and tra.vel or mission education, they came 
to feel that they were the victims of exploitation by the 
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administrative system. They complained of the tax system, 
the compulsory crop quota systems, especially as regards 
cotton, the inadequate prices paid for crop production, 
and the inequitable wage scales. With the influx of 
Portuguese immigrants, the best arable land was developed 
for these settlers, at times dispossessing Angolans from 
their traditional tribal lands. Perhaps the most grievous 
complaint uttered by the indigenous Angolans was related 
to the system of contract labor. Called outright slavery 
by some and veiled frequently by reform and liberalized 
legislation, the labor system in effect in Angola was 
seldom viewed with enthusiasm re[~ardless of liberalizinB., 
legislation. Labor laws governing the indigene isolated 
them from the mainstream of Angolan society. Village 
labor quotas, the contract labor system, the recruitment 
of laborers for plantations, all were studded with the 
use of force and the physical ill-treatment of the laborer. 
In the politjcal fi.eld, demands for self-government, 
self-determination, or independence had traditionally 
been regarded as subversive, and, in general, had been 
repressed. The Portuguese government had never been 
sympathetic toward any expression of Angolan nationalism, 
and no forum existed where discussion and/or negotiation 
with the authorities had been possible. The authorities 
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even denied the existence of a colonial problem or the 
validity of the right of autonomy or self-determination. 
All political movements favoring autonomy or self-
determination had been forced into clandestine activity 
or exile with the subsequent result of revolutionary 
activity. With an increase in underground activity, 
repressive measures were taken, especic::lly as neighboring 
African territories gained their independence. 
Despite repressive measures, independence move-
ments gathered strength as the leadership of the various 
opposition parties became more clearly evident. Numerous 
secret meetings were held throughout the country, es-
pecially in the larger urban centers and in the northern 
region where the Kikongo peoples were most in evidence. 
Anti-government literature was distributed through under-
ground organizations. After the independence of the 
Republic of the Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville, 
Angolan revolutionary groups were able to operate more 
freely among the Angolan communities in these countries. 
Communication networks were established between Angolan 
groups in exile and members and/or sympathizerE; of the 
cause in Angola. Through this communication system, 
rebel plans were made and executed with representatives 
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in even the smallest villages being aware of the progress 
of revolutionary activity.33 
Portuguese officialdom, concerned over the politi-
cal activity in Angola a.nd the grovdng strength of revolu-
tionery groups outside its borders, had increased its 
pressure against persons suspected of political activity 
or believed knowledgeable about clandestine rebel organiza-
tions. After the 1961 revolt, homes of anyone suspect 
were searched, and weapons were confiscated. During this 
period, as Africans were denied weapons, Portuguese 
settlers, especially on the frontier, were supplied with 
weaponry and trained in their use. 
As repressive measures intensified durin8 the 
1950's and 1960 1 s and the Portuguese government stead-
fastly rejected negotiations regarding self-determination 
or independence, three Angolan political groups resorted 
to guerrilla warfare as the only possible means of achiev-
ing their objectives. This question of outside influence 
and 11 agitatorsn linked up with these organizations looms 
important, especially from the Portuguese point of view. 
33Richard Mathews, HA Visit to the Rebels of Angola," 
Reporter, Vol. 25, No. 5 (September 28, 1961), p. 43. 
(Hereinafter referred to as "Rebels of Angola. 11 ) 
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Whatever the extent that agitators have been involved in 
the Angolan conflict or influence from other countries 
may have been in evidence, these would not alone be 
sufficient to explain the extent of revolutionary activity 
or the widespread appeal of the movement, unless there 
existed some genuine dissatisfaction and deeply-felt 
grievances. 
The overseas policies of Portugal have been based 
upon the concepts of national unity end cultural identity 
end the creation of a nmulti-raciallT society. The success 
of this concept demanded the recognition of common interests 
in the economic and social fields, a degree of adminis-
trative and financial autonomy, and the acknowledgement 
of the obligation of the Portuguese to protect the indige-
nous inhabitants and their interests. All forces were to 
work progressively toward the integration of Angolans into 
Portuguese civilized society.34 Basic to this ideology 
has been the concept of assimilation. According to this 
concept, any indigenous Angolan who wanted to be accepted 
as a member of the Portuguese community had to break away 
from tribc;l traditions and institutions in order to change 
34Nogueria, .££• cit., p. 51. 
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his African personality and to integrate himself into the 
culture and custom of Portuguese society. 
Within a theoretical framework, Portugal never 
practiced racial discrimination and never wanted to 
aclrnovJledge any difference other than those determined 
by the levels of civilization. Civil and political rights 
were to be granted with a progression in education. 
Theoretically, persons on the various levels in the 
assimilation process were aware that equality existed at 
each level, and ·were a.part from c:ny racial discriminetion. 
Becoming civilized, the indigena did not meet with a 
hostile or closed society, but with a 11Lusitanization" 
that integrated him completely. Limitations to equality, 
then, did not lie in a racial barrier, but in the cultural 
and technical backwardness of the non-assimilated.35 
B. POLITICAL RIGHTS AND RACE RELATIONS 
One main source of dissatisfaction leading to a 
breakdown of meaningful Portuguese-Angolan ties, and, 
consequently, to nationalistic activity, was the basic 
distinction in status between the indigene and the non-
3 5s. de lJ~iranda, "Education in Ang,ola, 11 Portuguese 
and Colonial Bulletin, Vol. I, Nos. 4 and 5 (June-July, 
1961 ) ' p. 3. 7. 
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indigene and the concomitant administrative practices. 
This basic distinction between European and non-European 
ways of life permeated all phases of society and became 
the basis of various discriminatory laws and practices. 
Under the Statute of 1954, for example, no political 
rights were granted to indigenous persons in respect to 
non-indigenous institutions. The Portuguese felt that 
non-indigenous institutions should be aspired to by the 
indigena and wanted the assirnilado to feel the signifi-
cance of his status. Thus, the policy of assimilation 
became unacceptable not only in theory but even more in 
practice, since it was based on a racist concept implying 
the incompetence of the African people and implying further 
that African cultural mores wBre of no value.36 That many 
Angolans, once assimilated, reverted to the status of 
the indigene substantiates this point. The granting of 
citizenship was not irrevocable; according to the Statute 
of 1954, Article 64, "The citizenship conceded or recog-
nized • • • can be revoked by decision of the judge of the 
respective circuit on the basis of evidence of competent 
J6 11 Atlantic Report--Angola," Atlantic, Vol. 209, 
No. 3 (March, 1962), p. 26. (Hereinafter referred to as 
11 Anr;ola. 11 ) 
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administrative authority.n37 This statute was not appli-
cable to citizens residine in Portugal. 
The decision of an Angolan to assume assimilado 
status was awesrnne. In addition to the difficulties of 
relinquishing the status of an indigena and of fulfilling 
all the conditions rec1uired to become a citizen, he rejected 
his ancestral culture and adopted a European way of life. 
Thus, assimilation often had the effect of isolating the 
educated African from his own people. Africans were 
granted equal status with the Portue;uese on the basis of 
equal education and other requirements. The legitimate 
aspirations of the Angolans to progress along lines more 
consistent with their own values and way of life were 
ignored. The recognition of elites based upon preparation 
for full status as a citizen also appeared to create a 
socially superior minority. After the 1961 revolt, the 
desire for assimilodo status lessened considerably. This 
was due to the growing desire among many Africans, 
especially in the North, to retain their African identity 
and a general reluctance to become totally identified 
with a European culture. 
37Panikkar, 2..12.· cit., p. 38. 
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In addition, since the revolt the status of the 
assimilado has been lowered by the influx of Portuguese 
Dmnigrants. Racial prejudice among this group was much 
more in evidence. 
The extent that racism has existed in Angola is 
not without controversy; there is ample writing to 
support either contention. The writer's purpose and 
his personal philosophy have tended to influence his 
judgment in evaluating the situation or date.. Camille 
Miropoix, writing in the tourist magazine, Travel, stated 
It is a treat to see the happy African soldiers 
at the changing of the guard and their great 
pride at being Portuguese. There is no
3
gepara-
tion between the white and black races. 
Conversely, K. Madhu Fanikkar points out that the 
Portuguese t1above all" want 
.•• to be recoe;nized as a white power .••• 
This emphasis on colour--of the Portuguese being 
the white man--is also to be found in the USA 
and the Union of South Africa. It really 
underlines the Portuguese position. They are 
obsessed by colour; the struggle is seen in 
apocalyptic terms as one between blacks and 
whites, with the ever present danger that the 
black will emerge triumphant.39 
3Scarnille Miropoix, "Unpublicized Angola," Travel, 
Vol. 107, No. 2 (February, 1956), p. 45. 
39Panikkar, 2.E.· £it., p. 35. 
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Panikkar further underscores his position by stating that 
• • • the arming of white civilia.ns and the 
formation of vigilantes who indiscriminately 
slaughtered all blacks clearly show that her 
object has never been to assimilate the African 
but to keep him as a helot, to be extenninated 
if he rose in revolt.40 
The Institute of Race Relations, Oxford University, 
conducted a symposium on Angola in 1962 and concluded that 
the Portuguese were a non-discriminating people on the 
issue of race, but discriminated by making class distinc-
tions.41 By dividing the professions and income groups 
on a racial basis, it can be shovm thc:.t the existing 
social economic barrier is enough to keep a tacit color 
bar in effect. In general, Portur;uese and Africans co-
exist professionally only in the lower quadrant, where 
competition is keener between the races. The nnon-
discriminatint:; 11 aspect of official legislation c2n only 
be perceived if discrDnination by class is recognized 
with its stultifying influence. 
Social co-existence of the Portuguese and the 
Afric2n was a pleasant and convenient image to project, 
especially with eighty per cent of the Angolan population 
40ibid. 
41Antonio de Figueiredo, 11 The Case Against Portugal," 
An ola A S osium: Views of A Revolt (London: Oxford 
University Press, 19 2 , p. 51. 
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scattered over the countryside away from an urban environ-
ment and Portuguese socio-economic influence.42 This 
partially answers ·why, four hundred years after the 
11 civilizint:; mission" began, only one per cent of the 
population had been culturally assimilated. 
In most western white-dominated multi-racial 
societies, political racism runs parallel and in propor-
tion to the degree of prosperity of the colored groups. 
This is true in the case of Angola. Higher income and 
Tfupper-crust 11 social groups, not havint; had tb e ir socio-
economic position challenged, saw no threat; the supreme 
test of socio-economic competition between the races 
never came, so restrictive legislation, such as exists 
in Rhodesia and the Republic of South Africa, was un-
necessary. 
In Luanda, blacks and whites work alongside one 
another on construction projects and mix in shops and 
cafes. In the slum areas on the outskirts, white families 
live in near destitution aloneside black families with the 
same economic conditions. Discrimin&tion is not in evi-
dence at this lower societal level. Unofficial segregation 
42cte Figueiredo, 2.2· cit., pp. 51-52. 
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exists, however, in the way of job discrimination, i. e., 
any job requiring an education.43 By law, no discrirnina-
tion of any sort can exist and an African can occupy any 
post in business, the professions, or the administrative 
. h h . ' . 11 1 . f . d 44 services w ere e is eauc2.tionc. y qua i ie -· In many 
cases, qualified Africans working in schools, hospitals, 
or the social services where integration exists have 
whites working for them. 
The Portuguese appear to have a tolerant racial 
attitude, but, eiven a set of circumstances, think in 
racial terms. The awareness of race goes deep and can 
come to the surface. This attitude permits blacks and 
whites to work on road ganr;s, mix in night clubs, have 
some black judges and mayors in the smaller municipali-
ties, and control two-fifths of all administrative posts, 
mostly at the lower leve1.45 But this tolerant attitude 
did not prevent the savage anti-black manhunt that followed 
43A. J. Meyers, ncolor Bar, TT U.S. News and World 
Report, Vol. LI, No. 9 (August 28, 1961), p. 54. 
44Ronald Waring, 11 The Case for Portugal," Angola, 
A Symposium: Views of A Revolt (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1962), p. 44. 
45 11 Angola Waits for It, TT Economist Newslaper, Ltd., 
Vol. CCIX, No. 6269 (October 19, 1963), p. 8. Hereinafter 
referred to as "Angola Waits. 11 ) 
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the savage anti-white manhunt in 1961. Nor has racial 
11 tolerancen added appreciably to intermarriage between the 
races. There has been in the past consirterable cohabita-
tion of races occasioned by necessity; i. e., the absence 
of white women. When the drug pentamidine removed the 
fear of sleeping sickness, women carne to Angola in greater 
nwnbers, with the consequence th2t interracial marriac;es 
and cohabitation declined proportionately, although some 
Portuguese continued to have their r 1mulJ:!ere~de 
necessidade. 11 46 
With the vast majority of Angolans living in a 
rural-tribal environment, Portuguese administrators had 
enacted a separate set of laws regulating those Africans 
residing in a tribal state. These laws had served to 
keep intact tribal customs and preserve traditional mores 
and attitudes, but, on the other hand, kept these Africans 
as indigene and without a vestige of political, economic, 
intellectual, or social freedom. These restrictive laws 
not only denied the indigene freedom of speech and fran-
chise--"luxuries" even the citizenry must forbear--but 
they could not tr2vel, work, buy, sell, plant, harvest, 
46Clifford Parsons, "The Makings of a Revolt," 
Angola, A ~posiwn: Views of A Revolt (London: Oxford 
University Press, 19'6'2T; p. 60. 
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meet in groups, or leave their villages without the 
specific pennissjon of the chefe de posto, the local ad-
ministrator.47 Through these restrictive measures, 
Portugal has steadfastly refused to admit that African 
nationalism may eventually have to be accommodated. 
Either the African was to become a loyal Portuguese-
speaking peasant or laborer, or he remained a tribal 
"native. 11 It should be pointed out that these tribal 
laws were generally effective until forei0n influence and 
ideas upset the social equilibrium. With outside influ-
ence permeating the stable tribal structure and upsetting 
it, especially after World War II, keeping the African 
population under strict control became more difficult. 
Until early 1961, there was every indication to 
the outside world that Portuguese colonial policy, which 
had hacJ the long-term aim of assimilation had successfully 
insulated Angola against the influences of African nation-
alism. After the independence of the Congo-Kinshasa, 
however, nationalistic ideas swept Angola. To counteract 
the revolutionary movements that followed, all Angolan 
natives became full Portuguese citizens after September 30, 
47Marvin Harris, nsouth of Lisbon See the Ten 
Million, ri Saturday Review, Vol. XLII, No. 30 (July 25, 
1959), pp. 19-20. 
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1961, and the aboriginal status was officially abolished.4g 
In African eyes, however, the Portuguese still appear the 
bosses, and the rulers, and they hardly correspond to the 
image this legal change was supposed to bring a.bout. It 
would appear that tl1is law and others adjusting other 
aspects of Angolan life ca.me too late to make a signifi-
cant difference. 
C. EDUCATION AND THE INDIGENA 
A great influence on the African indigene has been 
the quest for Western education. In a society that had 
placed its greatest emphasis on education, and had made 
it the key to all the society held as desirable 2nd good, 
this quest was understandable. Education held the key to 
social status, human dignity, job opportunities, and 
economic wealth. Education was the key to the success of 
not only the African indigene but was also tied to the 
effectiveness of the Portuguese administrative system. 
The system required the training of local adrninistrc.tive 
officers, postal clerks, native police officers, teleg-
raphers, etc., for the administration of the colonies. 
The government relied upon Africa.n interpreters who had 
48w ar ing, 21?.. cit. , p. 4 5 • 
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to be able to write and speak the Portuguese language. 
And, more important, perhaps, to "Christianize, 11 to 
wilesternize, n and to 11Lusitanize, TT or to "2ssimil2ten the 
native population, the educational system had to impart 
a rudimentary knowledge of arithmetic, reading, speaking, 
and writing. 
To achieve these objectives, the Portuguese 
c;overnment created t'.·10 distinct educational systems--one 
for Africans and the other for the white and the assimi-
lc:ted. This distinction was the "natural consequence of 
the degrees of socic~l and mental development. n49 Schools 
for African students were called rudimentary schools, 
since they provided the first introduction to civilization. 
The primary education system was provided for students 
possessin8 a stipulated level of mental and social devel-
opment. 
Under the Portuguese Constitution, the Catholic 
missions under the direction of a Portuguese See or 
Bishopric were especially protected and assisted by the 
government as educational and welfare institutions and as 
instrwnents of civilization. It was their exclusive 
responsibility to provide instruction especially designed 
for the indigene. 
49okuma, £.J:2· cit., p. 41. 
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The Statute of 1954 laid down certain general 
principles to be applied regarding the education of 
indigenous persons. Article 6 of the Statute provided as 
follows: 
The instruction especially intended for 
indisenous persons shall have as its general 
purpose the moral, civic, intellectual, and 
physical education prescribed by law and the 
imparting of work habits and work skill, as 
determined by the needs of both sexes and by 
social and reP:ional economic conditions. 
C..• 
It further provided that 
The instruction referred to in this 
article shall always be directed towards in-
culcating a knowledge of the Portuguese 
l&nguage, but the use of the vernacular 
language may be authorized as a means to that 
end.50 
Theoretically, the rudimentary schools did not 
constitute a system parallel to and distinct from the 
primary education system. The purpose of these schools 
was simply to provide an 11 adaptive 11 education; pupils 
proceeded from the rudimentary schools to the primary 
schools. The adaptive nature of the rudimentary schools 
made it pre-primary in character, since they preceded 
primary erlucation. Therefore, there was no discrimination 
50"The Statute of 1954," Yearbook on Human Ri~hts 
(New York: United Nations Publications, 1954), p. 23 • 
(Hereinafter referred to as Yearbook.) 
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of a racial character. The criterion applied was a purely 
educational one; the pupils who attended the rudirner:tary 
schools could not, because of their level of education 
and inadequate knowledse of the Portuguese lan~uaee, use-
fully attend pr~nary schools. 
The conditions on which a person of indigena status 
could attend the primary schools had been laid duwn in 
Article 6 of the St.c.tute of 1954: 
Those indigenous persons who have received 
tadaptivet training or who demonstrate, in the 
rrumner prescribed by law, that they do not re-
quire such trainine, shall be assured of admis-
sion to public schools under the conditions applica-
ble to other Portu8uese nationals.51 
Under the Constitution, primary education is 
compulsory and free to European and 11 assimilatedTT children; 
althou[;h, once quc::.lified through adaptive education to 
enter primary schools, there are no compulsory education 
laws applicable to children attendint; rudimentary schools 
or those indigenous children who mc:y have qu2lified for 
prDnary education.52 (See Tables II and III for a compari-
son of PortuGuese educational standards.) 
5lrbid. 
52united Nations, General Assembly, "Report of 
the Sub-Committee on the Situation in Anc;ol2, 11 A/RES/ 
497S, Sixteenth Session, New York (November 13, 1961). 
Country 
Austria 
West Germany 
Finland 
France 
Belgium 
Spain 
Greece 
Port. and Colonies 
(Metropolitan) 
(Colonies) 
>:~source: 
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TABLE II 
ILLITERACY RATE>:~ 
Popula_tion 
6,974 
68' 500 
4,241 
43,264 
5,868 
28,976 
7,973 
21,159 
8,765 
12 ,394 
Per Cent of 
Illitera.£Y_ 
1-2 
1-2 
1-3 
3-4 
3-4 
15-20 
25-30 
70-75 
40-46 
90-95 
"Education Under Salazar, n Portuguese and Colq_n~al 
Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February-March, 19"b4l, p. 185. 
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TABLE III 
YEARS OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION~:< 
Name of Country Age Limit 
East Germany 
France 
En0land 
West Germe:ny 
It2ly 
Austria 
Belr;iurn 
Holland 
Spain 
Portugal 
Greece 
Iran 
Egypt 
Ghana 
Morocco 
~:<Source: 
6-18 
6-16 
5-15 
6-15 
6-14 
6-14 
6-14 
7-15 
6-12 
7-13 
6-14 
Length of 
Course 
11 
10 
9-10 
8-9 
8 
8 
8 
8 
6 
4 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
"Education Under Salazar, 11 Fortuvuese and Colonial 
Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February-March, 1964), p. 155. 
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Many native grievances were readily traceable to 
the inadec;uacies and basic inequities of the educational 
syste1:1. The system was not created to serve the indige-
nous population but to provide an adequate education for 
tr10se r;ua.lifying as Portuguese citizens. First, in the 
interior regions of Angola there were few schools, even 
at the rudimentary level. Secondly, secondary education 
was not easily accessible to Africans due to fees which 
were exorbitant for most families. Third, to enter a 
government secondary school, a student had to be under 
fourteen years of a8e. Because most African children 
begin school at a later age than Portuguese or assimilado 
children, by the time the native child had completed the 
adaptive course the age limit became a" serions hurdle. 
Children of essimilado parents could 2utomatically attend 
secondary schools, while indigenous African children were 
compelled to comply vvith special requirements. The status 
of assimilation to wl1 ich everyone was to aspire was needed 
to have access to adequate educational facilities, but 
education was required for assimilation! Thus, a vicious 
cycle seer.ied to be operating, n1aking educ2,tion more 
difficult for the indigenous African to achieve. 
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In addition, adr1tittance to e secondary school 
required a birth certificate. If the birth had not been 
registered, 2 retroective tax was levied against the 
pupil's parents. Also, students entering from private 
and missionary schools were required to take strict en-
trance examinations, not a requirement for Portuguese 
and assimilado students. 
The obstacles pl.s.ced in front of a native African 
student were at least partially respons~ble for the small 
nur.-iber of Africen students e:ttending secondary schools. 
Also, the rudiHlentary course te.ught in the mission schools 
was distinct from and inferior to the primary schooling 
afforded the white or assimilated Africans in the urban 
areas.53 
To help overcome the inadequacies of the mission 
schools and overcome much of the criticism heaped upon 
them, the Bishop of Angola, Fr2ncisco Esteves Diaz, in-
augurated a program aimed at providing a more adequate 
rural education syste~. Much of the white population 
blamed the 1961 uprising on the alleged teaching of 
freedom end self-determination and sympathy for revolu-
tionary croups within the mission schools. A special 
No. 
53 11 Kingdom of Silence," Harper's Magazine, Vol. 222, 
1332 (May, 1961), p. 35. 
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tarc;et 2,t this time were Protestant assimil2dos, many of 
whom were trained in mission schools.54 
As in most African colonial areas, education had 
created an educ2ted elite. The elite group was not large, 
but actually enjoyed influence out of proportion to its 
numbers. This group was especi.slly important in Angola 
since: 
(1) the elite usually have sympathies and 
interests that go beyond the traditional 
tribal group; (2) they possess the skills to 
run a modern nation; ( 3) they are interested 
in building non-tribal organizations, such as 
political parties .:md cultural societies.55 
The creation of an educated elite has made Africans 
conscious of the inequalities of the Portuguese educational 
system. The fact that a separate system was created for 
native children is an irritant, and acted as a method of 
holding African children back from entering into secondary 
and higher education. 
Revolutionary organizations relied heavily on the 
inadequate educational system for much of their propa-
ganda against the Portuguese goverrunent. A statistical 
54 11 Civilizing Mission, n Newsweek, Vol. LVII, 
No. 25 (June 19, 1961), pp. 45-46. 
55okuma, .££· cit., pp. 43-44. 
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comparison between bleck and white education showed clearly 
the gulf between r2.ces created through the school system 
and how the inequity would perpetuete itself. A ninety-
seven per cent illiteracy rate among Africens existed. 
There 'dE:s room to acco::unodate only five per cent of the 
indigenous children of school age (7-13) in mission 
schools prior to 196o.56 Statistics like these did little 
to instill confidence in the African population, and it 
was not likely that they were to continue to look to 
Portugal for a solution to their problems. 
The 1961 revolt was responsible for many educa-
tional reforms as 2 crash pror;ram was started to close 
the gap between the rural and primary schools. Five 
hundred new teachers were added to the rural program, 
and space was constructed to ho1JSe 20,000 additional 
pupils in 1962, with the program doubling these statistics 
for 1963. In addition, Antola's first university was 
opened in Luanda in October, 1963, under the same program.57 
56Homer A. Jack, Angola, Repression and Revolt in 
Portuguese Africa (New York: American Committee on Africa, 
1960 ) ' p • 15 • 
57 11 Angola Waits, 11 212.· cit., pp. 239-240. 
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D. LABOR AS A FACTOR OF UNREST 
The labor situation in Angola has probably contri-
buted more to developing a negative relationship between 
the African native and white Portuguese than any other 
single factor. This negative Dnage is due, in part, to 
labor practices unchanged since the days of legalized 
slavery. Df~privation and a 12ck of human dignity have 
been the lot of the An[olan since the Portuguese first 
colonized th2 west African coast. 
The Portuguese government vvas one of the last in 
Europe to officially end slavery in its colonies. By its 
abolition the status of the African was not suddenly 
changed, and his relationship to the PortuL;uese was not 
perceptibly affected. The legal ten1inology was altered, 
however, and slcvery was transformed into e. more "accept-
able" labor system. Slavery became tutelage, forced 
labor, obligatory labor, contract labor. 
As Angola became a prosperous colony and the de-
mand for laborers incre2sed, Portugal becarne more dependent 
upon it to maintain a favorable balance of trade and to 
provide raw material resources. Portucal's pre-capitalist 
mercantilist economic philosophy placed a greater demand 
on Angola through the years. The labor system, as it has 
54 
evolved from slavery, was calculated to contribute to 
Fortug2l its material and human resources in the most 
efficient economic way practicable. 
Under the Constitution, indigenous persons were 
compelled to work, but only in specific instances. In 
this connection, Article 146 of the Constitution provided 
that: 
The State may only compel the natives to 
work on public WDrks of general interest to the 
community, on tasks the finished product of which 
will belong to them, in the execution of judi-
cial sentences of a penal charact~r or for the 
discharee of fiscal liabilities.58 
The use of compulsion in the recruitment of labor was 
prohibited for purposes other tha.n those cited above. 
The Portuguese government specificelly prohibited the 
recruitment of native labor for any firms working for 
their own profit. By law, indigenous persons were free 
to choose their own work, to work for themselves or for 
another, on their own land or on land 2llotted to them 
for this purpose. 
The oblig2tions of the employer toward the worker 
and the worker toward the employer were covered by the 
Native Labour Code of 192$. These obligations attempted 
to ensure the workerts adherence to the terms of his work 
5BuN A/4978, 2..2· cit., p. 27. 
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contract, provisions which pertaine_d to the medical, 
social, and educetional assistance to the worker and his 
family and his return to his place of residence. For 
example, the ew.ployer vvas to carry out scrupulously the 
terms of the contract; he could not require the perform-
ance of work beyond the strength of the vvorker; he could 
not prevent the worker frorn living with hi2. ovm family if 
working aw&y from home; he could not require the worker 
to buy goods from company stores and had to prohibit the 
sale or distribution of alcoholic beverages. The worker, 
on the other hand, was to obey the employer's orders 
provided they were in agreew.ent with the Native Labour 
Code. He was to perform all work enthusiastically and to 
the best of his ability and he could not leave the place 
of employment without previous authorization of the 
employer. By the Native Labour Code, every indigenous 
male inhabitant over eighteen years of age was obliged 
to procure an individual work-book (caderneta indigena) 
to serve as an identity card and record of employment. 
This work-book contained a profuse amount of data, includ-
ing person al 2.nd family inf orrnation, identification marks, 
employment history, and the m&nner in which he performed 
his duties as a native worker. 
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In addition to these entries, the caderneta 
indigena contained informstion relative to the payment of 
the native tax, vaccinations, or other treatment pertain-
ing to infectious diseases, the lands ovmed by the holder 
or freely assigned to him, the cattle which he owned and 
their registered brand, and other information which would 
be helpful as identification or in establishing rights. 
The Statute of 1954 iterated the official position 
of the government as it releted to the value of work: 
The State shall endeavor to teach the indigenous 
peoples that work is an indispensable element 
of progress, but the authorities may not impose 
labour except in the cases explicitly prescribed 
by law.59 
llfrogress," in this sense, implied that work was a part 
of the civilizing process even though there was little 
evidence to prove that work was a civilizing agent. 
There was, however, plenty of evidence that the native 
worker was degraded and exploited. Forcing the native to 
get a new perspective of his work role and obliEation to 
work often led to the exploitation of the native popula-
tion. 60 
59Yearbook, 2.12.• cit., p. 236. 
60Duffy, op. cit., p. 157. 
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The Portuguese government viewed work as a 
11moral obligation" for the indigenous native. This meant 
simply that every adult fourteen years of age or older 
was required to work, and the work had to be productive. 
Further, he had to support h irn2. elf and his farn ily end to 
contribute to the development of the territory, i. e., to 
be employed on public works. He had to work, in the 
absence of other employment, at least six months per year. 
The fulfillment of these laws and regulations led 
to many abuses, especially in reE;ard to the vast majority 
who 1.vere farmers. Africans had to show they were produc-
tive. The burden fell on every adult Angol2n African, 
the ;;iajority of whom normally lived on the lend, to prove 
to the local authori_ties that he was a productive element 
in the economy. 
This system of contract and obligatory labor has 
been defended by some apologists as the only system by 
which the indigene could be civilized, while retaining the 
tribal character of the people.61 To the defenders of the 
labor system this is the secret of Portugal's success as 
a civilizing agent. Legally, contract and obligatory 
labor were based on the Native Labour Code, which stated 
61Dr. Frederick P. Marjay, 11 Angola, 11 Seccao 
Anuario Comercial de Portugal (Lisbon: Livraria Bertrand, 
S.A., 196~ p. 32. 
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that every African had to satisfy the administration that 
he had h1orked .st leest six months in the previous year, 
or was workine at the time of inquiry. If the worker 
could not prove this, the odministration had the duty to 
put hDn to work. According to the law, the African either 
had to work in his own fields or to take a job with any 
employer who had a position. Workers were requisitioned 
by employine firms through the Governor-General, request-
ing the fulfillment of the orders by local chefes de posto, 
who were then obliged to 11recruit 11 the workers. The 
PortuBuese Constitution and the Native Labour Code 
specifically forbid 11 all L1ettiods by which the St2te under-
takes to supply Native workers to employers," and 11 all 
methods by which natives living in any territorial area 
whatsoever may be compelled to work for such employers 
under eny pretext whatsoever. 11 62 In feet, however, for 
the overwhelming mass of poor natives, there was nothing 
to look forwc:rd to but c:. lifetime of meniel 12bor, much 
of it forced. Tens of thousands of Angolan natives were 
rounded up annually and assigned to public works projects 
at 1vages which varied from $2 to $5 per month (reported 
in 1961).63 
62Basil Davidson, !'Africa's I·~odern Sl2very, 11 
Harper's Magazine, Vol. 212, No. 1250 (July, 1954), p. 57. 
63 11 The Next Explosion in Africa, 11 Nation, Vol. 192, 
No. 1 (January 7, 1961), p. J. 
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The contract labor system ran contrary to the 
traditional work patterns of native society which had 
existed for hundreds of years. Traditionelly, women did 
all the work that sustained the family from season to 
season. Polygamy was common until recently as a partial 
solution to the tc.sk force needed to keep the family alive 
in a subsistence economy. Work in its elf was considered 
neither ennobling nor desirable by the males, and, wher-
ever possible, was left to the women. This societal 
syst~1 did not encender itself to the labor system of the 
white man or to his demands upon the black men to perform 
work according to westernized standards. Neither contract 
and obligatory labor nor the low wage scales would induce 
the native to abandon his tribal state or the traditional 
subsistence economy. To this extent, then, the forced 
labor system was an evolved form of slavery with the 
individual ownership of a slave being replaced by the 
collective ownership of the African population by the 
Portuguese [~overnment and the business community. 64 Henry 
Nevinson and James Duffy in their investigations could 
find little distinction between contract labor and slavery. 
In addition, Basil Davidson has reminded us that, contrary 
to the conviction of many Europeans, very little was "done 
64de Figueiredo, .21?.· cit., p. 53. 
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for" Africans under colonial lc:,bor systems, as these 
systems were designed to bring cheap raw materials at low 
prices into Europe to satisfy the needs of the growing 
nwnufacturing industries.65 
It should be pointed out, however, that the 
Native Labour Code requiring six months' employment per 
year was an attempt to adjust the labor system to tribal 
life and customs. An International Labor Ort::;anization 
(I.L.O.) committee of three (Uruguay, Senegal, and Italy) 
visitin£ Aneola in 1962 reported favorably about the 
Portuguese contract labor system in the area visitect.66 
Dissatisfaction with the labor system has been widespread, 
however, and must be seen as one of the most important 
causes of unrest in the countryside. 
Local chefes de posto were required to recruit 
laborers from those natives who had not satisfied the 
work requirement. For public works projects requiring 
larc;e numbers of workers, laws were not strictly adhered 
to. Anyone in the villace was eligible if the local 
quota for workers was high and workers scarce. For 
65Basil 
African Studies 
(Johannesburg: 
Davidson, "Guide to African History," 
(formerly Bantu Studies), Vol. 23, Nos. 3-4, 
Witwatersrand University Press, 1964) p. 62. 
66Gene Farmer, "Dictator on the Defensive,!! Life, 
Vol. 52, No. lS (May 4, 1962), p. 105. 
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special projects, such as buildine roads or laying rail-
road ties, any pretense at contract labor was, therefore, 
abandoned, and whole towns were conscripted, reportedly, 
even children under fourteen, including girls and pregnant 
women.67 Not infrequently, whole towns would disappear 
into the wilderness as the chefe de posto would enter to 
conscript workers. 
The same was true in the cotton industry. Cotton 
has been the traditional crop in the Catete, Muxima, and 
Bolange regions for many generations, with European 
farmers devotint_: a great deal of time to it in the past. 
From the earliest cultivation dates, the Portuguese 
government protected and enhanced the industry through 
the institution of export bounties and the euarc:mteed 
purchase of the cotton crop at a fixed price. Cotton 
cultivation made real progress under this program, and 
native An~olans participated at a faster growth rate than 
whit<:; or assimilated AnLolans or immigrants. The Cassange 
region in ~alange alone was responsible for more than 
fifty per cent of the total Angolan production, and 
Catete for more than twenty per cent. The cotton program 
was a source of many serious grievances, and, interestingly 
67Richard LeMaster, 11 1 Saw the Horror of Angola, 11 
Saturd§_y Evening Post, Vol. 235, No. 19 (May 12, 1962), 
p. 53. 
62 
enough, the 1961 revolt against Portuguese rule had its 
first and most important impact in the cotton-growing 
regions of northern Angola. 
In the cotton-growing areas where the governmental 
program was in effect, every adult indigena was required 
to groH a certain c:rea in cotton. The cotton-raiser 
received no wa~es, but at the end of the season was paid 
according to the c:imount of cotton he had produced at 
prices fixed by the goverru~ent. Because the indigenous 
inh2bi t ants could not move mvc.y from the are.s~ without 
special approval, the indigene born in the cotton-zrowine 
area had no choice but to implement the program. The 
cotton program had certain aspects which paralleled forced 
cultivation. Africans believed they were at the mercy of 
the Portucuese governmental monopoly. 
Cot ton cul ti va ti on was not highly adv an. ced, and 
the soil was rapidly depleted, leading to shifting culti-
vation. As quotas could not be met, the government 
assigned plots of land to the farmers for cultivation. 
Over the years, many farmers were tilling soil on plots 
as far as fifty miles from their residence. In many 
cases, farmers could not return home daily, and, in effect, 
became involuntary migrant laborers. The only other 
recourse open to them was to move to the new plot and 
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remain there until the soil was exhausted, thus requiring 
another move. More often than not, however, families 
were required to reme in in the vill 2ges to cult i Vee te the 
food crops and care for livestock on private plots of 
land, since £rowing crops other than cotton on assiEned 
lands, or raising livestock, was prohibited and punish-
able. 
Complaints were frec;uent. Many claimed that 
government cotton prices were fixed low, at a bare sub-
sistence level, and that, at times, the fixed prices 
themselves were not paid. An investigation conducted by 
the United Nations throue:h the I.L.O. (International 
Labour Organization) confirmed these complaints as justi-
fied notin.e; price and wage inequities existed.66 With 
the inequitable price structure and the other evils built 
into the system, the cotton program was the source of much 
tribal unrest. The injustices arising from the program 
led to uprisings in two cotton-growing areas in 1960 and 
1961, Catete and Malant;e. The revolt was responsible for 
the repealine; of the compulsory cotton cultivation laws 
in May, 1961, three months after the rebellion began. 
Also, Portuguese Overseas Minister Moreira announced that, 
68uN A/4976, .21?.· cit., p. 30. 
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in October, 1962, the Native Labour Code was to be altered 
to abolish compulsory labor and punishment for absentee-
ism. 69 
E. THE CHURCH AS A DISRUPTIVE FORCE 
The missionary movement had been a part of 
Portuguese colonial policy since Prince Henry and Diogo 
Cao first made the "civilizing mission!! an indispensable 
aspect of Portueuese thought. The task of Christianizing 
the African was entrusted to the Roman Catholic Church. 
Since that time it shared most of the successes and fail-
ures of Lusitanian policy. Catholic missionaries were 
eac;erly s ou['.;ht by the Portuguese government to assume the 
res pons i bi li ty of Tl civil iz inc; 11 the Anf:ola.n natives by 
recasting hjm sociologically as a western European. Since 
the Roman Catholic Church was an integral part of the 
Portuguese culture, it was natural that this partnership 
enjoyed a preferential status in the colonies. 
Protestant missionary groups, not enjoying a 
favored position, did not become a part of the colonial 
structure until 1885 when the Berlin Act of that year 
required all signatories at the conference to agree that: 
69 11Labor Reforms Planned for Portuguese Africa,n 
Africa Report, Vol. 7, No. 8 (August, 1962), p. 20. 
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They (i.e., all signatories) shall, without 
distinction of creed or nation, protect 2nd 
favor all religious, scientific, or charitable 
institutions, 2nd underta1:<::ings ••. which aim 
at instructing the nc:tives and bringing home 
to them the blessing of civilization. 
Christian :-rlissionaries ••. shall likewise be 
the objects of special attention. Freedom of 
conscience and religious toleration are ex-
pressly guaranteed to the natives, no less than 
to subjects and to foreir,ners.70 
While both Catholic and Protestant missionaries have had 
measurable success converting large portions of the 
population (over fifty per cent), there is a serious 
question regarding the extent and depth that this influ-
ence has had upon African life. There is, however, no 
doubt that Angola missionary activities led to the modi-
fication of the Anc:olan traditional society, through 
education, through the weakening of traditional authority, 
through the introduction of the ideal of equality, and 
through the creation of an African clergy.71 
Neither the Catholic nor Protestant church in 
Angola took an official position on African nationalism 
or the revolt of 1961. Official ties of the Catholic 
Church to the Fortur;uese government negated chances that 
an official pronouncement regarding the rebellion would 
be made. Having no official governmental ties, Protestant 
70crowe, 2.£· cit., p. 190. 
7lokuma, 2.£· cit., p. 51. 
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missionary societies enjoyed greater latitude in the 
educational influence they had, especially regarding 
nationalism, and were freer to criticize. 
The Catholic clergy had, by and large, felt con-
trol by Portuguese officialdom, and, indeed, most mission-
aries permitted other national cultures to permeate 
Angola.n society end in this way to 11 teach" standards 
alien to the Portuguese stereotype. Most Protestant 
missionaries used the native language in mission schools, 
thus impeding the implantation of Portuguese language and 
customs.72 Legally, native languages could be used only 
to facilitate the teaching of the Portuguese language. 
The 1961 revolt created problems for the Catholic 
and Protestant churches in Angola. Angolan clergymen, 
like Canon dos Neves, Vicar-General of the Archbishopric 
of Luanda, and the Chancellor of the Diocese, the 
Reverend Pinto de Andrade, openly sided with the rebel 
element and were arrested and imprisoned for their 
11 pol i tic al crimes. 11 On April 15, 1961, the bishops of 
Angola met in Luande, and, althour:h they condemned the 
attacks made by the African Nationalists on villages, 
also pointed out that the just aspirations of the people 
72okuma, 212.· cit., p. 53. 
67 
had to be taken into account by the Portuguese government 
if they wished to avoid discontent and trouble.73 The 
'
1official" position of the Catholic bishops of Angola 
was read to 211 parishioners in May, 1961, in the form 
of a pastoral letter, a portion of which st2ted: 
Disillusioned people fighting against privation 
are a prey to despair and more apt to be carried 
away by dangerous ideologies and promises which 
cannot be fulfilled. Poverty is a bed counselor 
and a threat to tranquillity and peace. The solu-
tion of certain problems cen be found only throut_;h 
united and adequate legislation and the total and 
generous cooperation of individuals and oreaniza-
tions. 74 
In Jime, 1961, the situation became so intolerable 
thc:,t Protestant and Catholic clergymen in the United 
States and Canada, prompted by missionaries in Angola, 
a;)peeled to end the 11wholesale bloodshed in the Portuguese 
colony," and 11 urged a joint consultation of Portuf;uese 
and Angolan leaders to end indiscriminate killings by 
seeking a reasonable solution to Angola's problems. 1175 
Similar requests for restraint and understending came 
73nThe Catholics and Salazar, 11 Port~uese and 
Colonial Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 1 (April/rllay, 1902), p. 79. 
71+ 11 0pen Letter on Portugal, 11 Commonweal, Vol. 74, 
No. 13 (June 23, 1961), p. 326. 
75"Angolan Massacres Continue,n The Christian 
Century, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 3 (July 26, 1961), p. 894. 
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from the World Council of Church es, the Council for 
?reedorr: in Portw~~al encl the Colonies (located in Loncl on), 
the Baptist Missionary Society, and influential Catholic 
cler,symen, like the Bishop of Oporto. These groups or 
individuals openly broke vvith Premier Salazar's policies 
in Anc;ola. 
The Portuguese Government is aware of the poten-
tial threat to colonial rule from Catholic and Protestant 
churches and organizations. In response to this threat, 
the Governor-General of Angola ordered local administrative 
officials to attend all church services and meetings held 
in their juridical areas.76 
While no official judgment publicly condemned the 
churches' role as instruments in the civilizinc; process, 
there was a £1:reat amount of criticism ag2inst missionary 
societies for their role in training catequistos. Accord-
ing to the Portuguese goverrunent, the Gospel taught in the 
mission schools was unquestionably a factor in developing 
a spirit of self-determination among the Angolan people. 
The 11 failure 11 of missionaries to teach patriotism and 
loyalty to the Portuguese government and the "influence 
of outsiders" were to take the blame for the unrest in 
the An~olan countryside. 
-----·---
76okurna, .2..£· cit., p. 57. 
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CHAPTER III 
REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE REVOLUTION 
While the other colonial powers were coming to 
terr.13 with their colonies, each in its own way, with the 
rising African nationalism of the post-World War II 
period, Portugal preferred to deny that she had any prob-
lem in her territories, and tbus made no serious attempt 
to deal with it. It was, of course, impossible that 
Angola could be insulated against the independence move-
ments that have swept through Africa the last two decades. 
PortU£::uese policy failed to recognize the legiti-
11acy of any nationalist aspir2.tions for self-deternii112tion 
and independence of Angola. The stated objective of 
Portuguese policy vvas to create an integrated mul ti-rc:cial 
society in Anc:ola as the only lesting solution to tllat 
territory's problems. President Salazar stated just prior 
to the February, 1961, revolt: 
The familiar treatrnent of successive generations 
has forced 2nd consolidated the unity that was 
foreseen at the outset. It is, therefore, no 
political or legal fiction but a social and 
historical fact translated in Constitutions, 
which raises very serious difficulties for those 
who intend to dedicate themselves now to the 
task of emancipating Portuguese Africa. They 
come too late, for the job has already been 
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done. That unity does not allow of trans-
fers, cession, or abandonment. The juri-
dical figures of the plebiscite, the refer-
endum, auto-determination do not fit into 
its structure either.77 
And yet, the Angolan revolution is now in its 
eighth year. This revolution is the first genuine 
challenge to the Portuguese colonial system, and there 
appears to be every indication that the revolt will con-
tinue until the Angolan problem is ultimc:tely resolved. 
To help determine the 11 immediate 1' c2use of the insurrec-
tion, a United Nations investigation committee with 
Bolivia, Dahomey, Finland, The Federation of Malaya, and 
Sudan serving as members was named. Their report stated 
that the development of politicc:'.l aspirations a.mane: the 
Angolan peoples appee.red to stern from the lack of an 
ability to express grievances, especially over the loss 
of their· land to Portuguese farmers, to cotton cultiva-
tion, and to harsh labor conditions and policies.78 
Some expression had been permitted in the 1920 1 s 
when the HLiga Africana 11 and the Regional Association of 
the Natives of Angola were formed. These groups 1r.rere not 
77Portuguese Foreign Policy ,''Portugal and the 
Anti-Colonialist Cmnpaign;1 Oliveira Salazar, speech de-
livered before National Assembly, November 30, 1960, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin (1965), p. 13. 
78uN (A/4978), 22· cit., p. 42. 
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permitted to act as a vehicle for criticism against condi-
tions or policies. They were formed to forge a closer link 
between Portuguese officialdom and the Angolan native popu-
lation. After World War II, many insurrectionist groups 
were forL1ecl in other African colonies. Angol2.n leaders 
renewed efforts to give expression to their grievences 
and political aspirations. Because Antolan nationalist 
activities were not permitted, this led to the formation 
of cla.ndestine underground political or[enizations which 
extended their activities from inside Anc;ola to those who 
had fled the territory and were residing in neighboring 
countries. It would appear that the only 11 benefit 11 to 
the Portuguese prohibition of political activity gained 
at this point was time--the world press would not become 
nAngola-rnindedll until 1961; until thet tirae, silence in 
the countryside would be synonymous with peace and 
harraony. 
Althour::h between thirty-five and forty revolutionary 
groups organized in Angola since 1954, only three have 
garnered popular support in large nwnbers and are able to 
conduct guerrilla activity on a respectable scale. In 
1954, the U.P.A. (Union of the Peoples of Angola) was 
founded in Leopoldville in the Republic of the Congo 
under the leadership of Holden Roberto. In 1956, the 
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M.P.L.A. (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) 
was organized inside Angola by Dr. Agostinho Neto and 
Mario de Andrade. In 1959, the M.P.L.A. was declared a 
subversive organization by the Portue.::uese government, and 
was, therefore, moved to Conakry, Guinea, and then to 
Leopoldville, Congo. In 1966, U.N.I.T.A. (National Union 
for the Independence of all of Angola) under the leader-
ship of Jonas Savimbi was founded by a revolutionary 
vling of the U .P.A. which had [;rown dissatisfied vvith 
Holden Roberto's leadership. The U.P.A. passed out of 
existence in 1962 when G.R.A.E. (Revolutionary Government 
of Angola in Exile) emerged. G.R.A.E. represented a 
coalition of the FNLA (National Liberation Front in 
Angola) with the U.P.A., which had a multi-ethnic leader-
ship anrl a popular followinc amonc P.D.A. (the Angolan 
Democratic Party). The P.D.A. represented the Dazombos, 
a sub-group, of the Dekongo tribe which is centered in 
northern Angola and in the two Congas. The Kikont;os are 
also a sub-group of the larger Bakongo tribe. Both the 
U.P.A. and the P.D.A. had origin2lly organized within the 
large emigr~ population that had fled to the Congo-Kinshasa. 
The 0.A.U. (Organization for African Unity) in 
Auf;ust, 1963, met in Dakar where it was decided that 
Angola was to be given top priority because of the state 
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of war that existed with Portuga1.79 Top priority meant 
that whatever material aid possible would be made avail-
able to GRAE by the OAU 1 s Liberation Committee. Holden 
Roberto, as president of GRAE, predicted a short war 
with victory for the revolutionaries. It soon became 
apparent, however, that Roberto vvas underestimating 
Portug2l's tenacity and overestimDtin.c the aid forth-
coming from the 0.A.U. Recocnition by the O.A.U. gave 
impetus to an increese in the organizetion's military, 
diplomatic, anrl educational areas plus that of refugee 
relief.SO If GRAE's resources were not adequate to meet 
demands in these areas, there was a great psychological 
letdown among the group's membership~ 
Many Ovimbundu tribesmen wanted to see the revo-
lution spread from the Bakongo stronghold in the north, 
eastHard and southward, to open revolutionary activities 
in this larger area. This Roberto would not do. He was 
accused of favoring the BakonGO peoples and of failing 
to expand the revolution. (One important reason for 
Roberto's reluctance was his friendship to Cyrille Adoula, 
79John Marcum t1Three Revolutions 11 Africa Report, 
Vol. 12, No. S (Novem~er, 1967), p. 10. ' 
SO Ibid. 
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the president of the Congo-Kinshasa. Adoula feared that 
rebel activity in the south would c2use the closing of 
the Benguela Railway, greatly needed to export Katangan 
copper.) Dh.:;2,ppointed, a general mutiny occurred among 
Ovimbundu guerrillas, and GRAE's forei[n minister, Jonas 
S2vimbi, chief spokesman for the dissident group, withdrew 
from GRAE and traveled to Cairo. Thus, instead of a 
sin[le revolutionary group, three distinct groups were 
actively seeking converts to their cause by the begin-
ning of 1963. 
In July, 1963, the OAU re commended that African 
st2tes formally recognize the Revolutionary Government of 
Angola in Exile (GRAE) as the only Angolan revolutionary 
movement effectively fighting for independence. This 
pronouncement spurned the efforts of the T-:PLA and the 
embryonic nsavimbi-ledn Ovimbundu element. By November, 
1964, Roberto's GRAE had been recognized by twenty-nine 
African states.Bl The only country to recognize the 
Angolan Government-in-Exile to date outside the African 
continent is Iraq.82 
81 "Africa in the Soviet Press: Angol2, 11 The T·Iizan 
Newsletter, Vol. 6, No. 11 (December, 1964), p. 22. 
S2 11 Angola--Continued Guerrilla Activities in 
Northern and Eastern Areas~ 11 Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives (April S-15, 1967;, p. 21965. 
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Pursuant to the OAU 1 s recommendation thot member 
states should deal only with GRAE, the Adoula-led Congo-
lese government in late 1963 closed the headquarters of 
the MFLA and forced Dr. Agostinho Neto, its leader, to 
move his offices across the river into the Congo-
Brazzaville. Neto considered his moveffient sacrificed by 
the forces of Himperialism, 11 acting throui;h the inter-
mediary of a Congolese eovernnent that h2d given the GRAE 
military trainine bases (Kinkuzu and Thysville) exclusive 
access to the Angolan border, "de jure 11 recognition, and 
support from the OAu.SJ Neto organized his small militia 
into whet was referred to as the People's Liberation Army 
(EPLA) and launched rc:;ids on the enclave of Cabinda. 
Many Angolan Bakongo tribes became interested in 
restoring the former Kongo Kingdrnn to unite eventually 
with the larger Bakongo tribesmen in the Congo-Kinshasa, 
of which they were a sizable sub-group. In April, 1965, 
five Eakongo secessionist moveffients banded together, 
thereby rejecting GRAE leadership. This croup orcanized 
the Patriotic Front for the Independence of Kongo from 
Portugal (FFIDK) and attempted to negotiate with the 
Portuguese government for sovereig;nty to be granted to 
S3Marcum, 2.12.· cit., p. 12. 
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the geographic region that was traditionally B2k6ngo. 
The Salazar government, of course, refused not only to 
accede to their demands but also refused even to recognize 
them as a legitimately organized group. 
This low point of 1964-1965 for Roberto's GRAE 
cave Neto's MPLA an opportunity to regain much of the 
stature formerly enjoyed while based in Leopoldville. 
The principal problems of the I"1PLA ·were gettinc financial 
backinE: and obtaining supplies to keep the revolution 
alive and forceful. As Congo-Brazzaville was receiving 
communist aid, it appeared natural to the MPLA leadership 
to tap this material support, especially since it was 
commonly believed amonE; the rebel groups that n:uch of 
Portugal's aid came as a result of its N.A.T.O. member-
ship.S4 Soviet aid and Cuban instructors--even a visit 
froln Ch /e 0 th MPLA d f uuevara--[ave e a renewe. ervor. The 
IIPLA had competition from e newly forrr1ed Liberation Front 
for the Freedom of the Enclave of Csbinda (FLEC); however, 
since ~PLA's procra~ envisioned independence for An8ola 
and Cabinda as a single unit and not Cabinda as a separate 
nation, FLEC refused to cooperate with the NPLA. The 
latter, nevertheless, continued to concentrate its efforts 
on Cabinda. 
84 11rJationalist Pla.ns Massive Onslaught Against 
Portugal,'' African Recorder, Vol. III, No. 24 (November 19-
December 2, 1964), p. 911. 
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As of lete 1967, the political and military 
position of the MPLA was obscure. Politically, it is led 
by a predominantly Oviinbuncu intellic;entsia from the 
Luanda-Catete region, and is dedicated to the thesis that 
class, not racial conflict, should be the core of the 
Ancolan revolution.S5 Its strongest appeal exists in the 
urbanized sectors of the Kimbundu-speakinc corrmmnity of 
over 1,000,000 persons in north-central Aneola, but its 
milit2ry operc::tions c::re quite fragmented. 
In direct response to the great problems faced 
during 1964-1965, Holden Roberto announced that, if 
offered, he would accept Soviet and Red Ch i_nese aicl. 86 
In a speech delivered in Leopoldville, Roberto stated, 
Until now we have kept out of the cold war and 
within the frmnework of African politics, but 
we .ere no'J1T at a po int where a r&dical change of 
pol icy is irnp~r2t i ve for us to make headway in 
our struggle.ti? 
He had come to the conclusion that the Western countries 
were hypocritical since they continued to supply Portugal 
85Marcum, 2.£· cit., p. 12. 
86 11Portuguese Africa," .212.· cit., p. 8. 
87nForeign Assistance for Revolution,n African 
Recorder, Vol. III, Vo. 8 (April 9-22, 1964), p. 740. 
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with arms despite their declared belief in self-
determinc:tion. In .sddition, Roberto stated, 
There is alweys insufficient aid for a revolu-
tion such as ours; it is from the African 
countries tbat we have received 2id so far. 
But our African brothers have their problems 
too. ~ie will, therefore, appea~8 to 2nyone for aid--even to the devil himself. 
The Soviet press watched the An~olan revolution 
closely in 1964-1965, and 2 E':reat amount of propat;anda 
aeainst Roberto and in favor of Neto and Andrade was 
evidenced. Two Pravda articles written by the Soviet 
political writer, V. Midtsev, illustrated the official 
Soviet attitude. The anc:lysis lamented that the MPLA 
and the UPA were actively competing with one another, 
thus, "seriously weakeninc; their position and consider-
ably dau1ac;ing the strw:;gle for independence." Midtsev 
further lamented that Roberto rejected the sugGestion of 
the MPLA, 11 2 progressive p&triotic party, 11 that a single 
front should be created. "The Americans woulrl like to 
make Holden and his supporters 'their men.' 11 "It is also 
noteworthy that life is forcing Roberto Holden somewhat 
to re-examine his position." ~ihile 11until recently he 
never turned for help to the socialist countries," in 
recent months his speeches had indicated criticism of 
ns 0 Ibid. 
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American policy 2nd a desire for eid from the soci2list 
countries. Midtsev continued: 
The Soviet public does not epprove of the nega-
tive at ti tnde of Holden tmvards the unification 
of all the national forces of the Aneolan 
people in a single anti-colonialist front and 
toward the question of cooperation with the 
MPLA. At the seme time it evaluates positively 
the change
8
in his attitude toH2rds the socialist 
countries. 9 
The GRAE organization weathered the 1964-1965 low point 
in its power and prestige, 2nd Roberto chose to continue 
his independent path. 
W1ile the 19G4-1965 period was a low point in 
GRAE power and effectiveness, and was, indeed, a fight 
for survival, it was for the MPLA the opportunity needed 
for a comeb<'lck and possibly a wresting of control from 
the GRAE. The r'IPLA continued its hcrassment of Portupiese 
positions in Cabinda; military operations against GRAE 
forces in northern An~ola were begun, and a new third 
front was opened in the Angolan panhandle to challenge 
the Savimbi-led rebel forces there. 
The strong force in eastern Angola was UNITA, 
which had been orr,anized by ,Jonas Savirnbi efter his 
break with Roberto in 1964. UNITA was organized in 
89nAfrica in the Soviet Press: Angola," The 
Nizan Newsletter, Vol. VI, No. 4 (April, 1964), p. 21. 
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Brazzaville primarily out of disenchanted or discontented 
members of the MPLA and GRAE movements. Three main 
groups joined Savimbi's UNITA: the AlVIANGOLA cadre of 
ex-GRAE militants (AlVIANGOLA (Friends of the Angolan 
Manifest]); central and southern Angolan students abroad 
who belonged to the National Union of Angolan Students 
(UNEA), and local leaders of the former Chokwe, Lwena, 
and Luchazi self-help associations.90 Angolan refugees 
in Zambia also joined the UNITA organization. In March, 
1967, Savimbi 1 s effectiveness in eastern Angola was 
greatly restricted when his Zambian residence permit was 
not renewed. UNITA forces had temporarily cut the 
Benguela Railway link to Zambia, and the Portuguese 
government had demanded that Zambian officials control 
rebels using their territory as a haven or face closure 
of the railway. As in Katanga, the need to move copper 
over the railway demanded that action be taken against 
UNITA. Ultimately, Savimbi fled to Cairo and UNITA 
splintered into smaller, less-effective political groups. 
The most ·significant aspect of the revolution has 
been the ability of GRAE-leader Holden Roberto to survive 
in the face of all obstacles and remain head of the most 
9~arcum, .2..I?.· cit., p. 13. 
81 
vibrant military force of the revolution. One reason for 
Roberto's success rests with the ability of GRAE-UPA to 
occupy a prominent position in the minds of all Angolans 
desiring independence.91 The UPA was responsible for 
starting the insurrection and the Portuguese press, 
broadcasts, and public demonstrations accused the UPA of 
starting the war. Through the years, the UPA (now GRAE) 
has remained a household "wordlT in Angolan towns and 
villages. 
Holden Roberto, president of the revolutionary 
Angolan Government-in-Exile, was born in the small 
Angolan town of Sao Salvador in 1925. In 1927, his 
family moved to the Congo, and he has returned to Angola 
only four times since infancy--in 1932, 1940, 1951, and 
1956. Roberto's first inclination to become a revolu-
tionary and fight the Portuguese came during a visit to 
Angola in 1951 when he witnessed a chefe de posto beat 
and kick an old man. In the same year, Roberto, himself 
a Protestant, sought aid from Protestant organizations 
and the United Nations. In 1952, he joined the Union of 
the Peoples of Northern Angola (UPNA) and remained in 
membership until 1954 when he became convinced the 
organization, being interested in restoring the Kongo 
91TTAngola,n .Q.P.· cit., p. 28. 
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kingdom, was too narrowly oriented to be successful as a 
revolutionary movement. The UPNA, being made up of 
Kikongo tribesmen, a part of the larger Bakongo group, 
did not show an interest in joining with other ethnic 
groups in Angola and fighting a common battle--that of 
independence for all Angola. For this reason, Roberto 
founded the Union of the Peoples of Angola, as a party 
pledged to bind all the peoples of Angola into the common 
cause. In spite of his supra-nationalism, he has been 
accused of favoring the northern Kikongo peoples. 
In September, 1958, Roberto boarded a ship at 
Pointe Noire and sailed to Douala, Cameroun. From there 
he walked and hitch-hiked to Accra, Ghana, where he 
attended the first All-African Peoples Conference in 
December.92 His proficiency in English, French, Portuguese, 
and some native languages enabled him to work as an inter-
preter at the conference. In 1959, he came to the United 
States as TtJose Gilmour, 11 a member of the Guinean delega-
tion to the United Nations. 
Roberto, a Baptist, was educated at a Methodist 
mission and attributes his revolutionary spirit to his 
92John Marcum, "Angola Rebellion: Status Report," 
Africa Report, Vol. IX, No. 2 (February, 1964), p. 5. 
THereinafter referred to as Marcum, S.R.) 
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avowed faith in the efficacy of the Christian religion. 
Roberto became a rebel 11 because a Christian who remains 
silent before a crime becomes a participant in that 
crime. 93 
At the outset, Roberto envisioned the role o~ the 
UPA as an organization conducting sabotage and creating 
general disobedience toward the Portuguese government by 
the Angolan populace, but maintain~ the insurrection only 
became bloody when the Portuguese ordered a series of 
11brutal" repressions.94 This account, however, is very 
likely false, since many recountines of the first day of 
the insurrection are typical of the following: 
The day began like almost all Angolan days in 
the north, the people rose at the first light of 
dawn, lit their breakfast fires, and warmed them-
selves against the chill of the early morning 
mist. Few (natives) went to work on the coffee 
plantations or hunted, but met--thousands of 
them--by plan at the edge of the towns in the 
valleys and (at the prescribed time) attacked. 
Local Portuguese chefes de posto, plantation 
foremen, merchants, and women and children were 
mutilated and hacked to death; an African way of 
showing contempt for the enemy. Thus began 
Angola's revolt for independence.95 
93Farmer, 2.E· £it., p. 105. 
94 11Revolt in A Non-Colony," Time, Vol. LXXVII, 
No. 14 (March 31, 1961), p. 20. 
95Lloyd Garrison, "Now Angola: Study of A 
Rebel,n New York Times Magazine (February 16, 1964), p. 13. 
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Roberto did, however, have instruction sheets passed out 
to· rebel soldiers over his signature which required that 
each unit in the.field was to select an individual to 
transmit information and to receive UPA commands. The 
person chosen was not to express personal views, but 
views of the whole population. There was to be no steal-
ing by UPA soldiers and no Portuguese items seized were 
to be kept. Cooperation between the youth and the elders 
was to be urged. 
All money the soldiers could lay their hands on 
was to be forwarded tb UPA headquarters in Leopoldville, 
because "if we do not have money our work for independence 
cannot continue.1196 
Richard Mathews, a journalist, traveled with the 
rebel troops for a period following the insurrection and 
observed that 11 the UPA members were treated with warmth 
and admiration 11 in the rebel-held Angolan villages and 
appeared to have "won real support in northern Angola.n97 
In addition, he observed that the revolt appeared to be 
96 11Rebels of Angola,n QQ· cit., p. 43. 
97 Ibid . , p. 41. 
neither anti-white nor anti-European but was, rather, 
anti-Portuguese. The thing most hated was the forced 
labor system.98 
Roberto attempted to set up negotiations between 
his government-in-exile and the Lisbon government, but 
the possibilities for negotiated settlement were slim, 
especially since the official Portuguese position denied 
the existence of Angolans as people separate from the 
Portuguese. Robertors conditions for settlement of the 
rebellion were forwarded to the United Nations in 1963. 
He demanded recognition of the right of self-determination, 
the withdrawal of Portuguese troops, the freeing of 
political prisoners, and general amnesty.99 
The GRAE leadership has abandoned hope that 
Western nations will force Portugal into a negotiated 
sett~ement through a severance of its NATO ties or through 
a blockade of arms and materials. It is this lack of 
action or commitment by the Western world that has caused 
Roberto to look Eastward to seek support for the revolu-
tion. The longer the war lasts and the longer the 
98rbid., p. 43. 
99Marcum, S.R., 2.£· cit., p. 7. 
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Western countries &re dilatory in their avowed commitment 
to self-deterniinat ion, the more will be undermined the 
basis for a friendly relationship with a future independent 
Angola. 
87 
CHAPTER IV 
ANGOLA AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS · 
There was genuine concern throughout the world 
early in 1961 that the Angolan insurrection would become 
a threat to world peace. Few people, even governments, 
are quite so concerned eight years later about the urgency 
of this war. Yet, because it is a war that has a large 
region resembling a military bastion, its effect on 
world peace should be ascertained. At a time in history 
when colonialism is not fashionable, and since Portugal 
is determined to continue a course contrary to historical 
trends, it is clear that one worldwide repercussion will 
be the loss of friends by Portugal. The newly emerged 
nations are quite vehement in their condemnation of 
Portugal's historical "mission," and, indeed, may become 
naction-minded" with respect to their own world "mission. 11 
The recent histories of the Afro-Asian and 
communist bloc countries have oriented them against the 
Portuguese position. The so-called Western democracies, 
while perhaps not in tune with ~he Salazar·thesis, super-
impose this crisis on top of a much greater world problem--
the Cold War. 
88 
By request of a large number of Afro-Asian states, 
the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly 
have investigated, insofar as Portuguese cooperation 
would permit, the situation in Angola, and have expressed 
anxiety over the conflict and its effect on international 
peace and security. During the debates in the General 
Assembly and the Security Council, a number of representa-
tives stated that Portugal's policies and palliative 
measures had aroused strong sentiments in their countries, 
and that the continuance of the war was likely to have 
international repercussions; i. e., Portugal would likely 
suffer from blockades, embargoes, and a loss of friends. 
The ability of the United Nations to deal directly 
with the Angolan revolt was somewhat restricted, since 
Portugal maintained that because Angola was an ''overseas 
province" and, hence, an integral part of Portugal itself, 
the struggle was an internal one. The General Assembly, 
however, could not ignore the individuals and nations who 
testified that the rebellion was the consequence of genuine 
grievances of the indigenous population against the admin-
istration of the territory. These gr~evances included 
dissatisfaction with economic conditions, specifically the 
contract labor system, labor quotas, labor recruitment, 
and the physical ill-treatment of laborers. The impact of 
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African nationalism, especially on the Kikongo tribe; 
the rise of political groups, like the MPLA, which sought 
a redress of grievances; and the severe repression to 
which these groups had been subjected added to the dis-
satisfaction of the Angolan people. 
The disturbances and conflicts have resulted in 
the loss of thousands of lives, the flight of roughly 
300,000 refugees from the territory, and the creation, 
consequently, of a veritable atmosphere of conventional 
warfare. Because of the decadence of colonialism to most 
nations of the worlq today, especially Afro-Asian, the 
response was predictable and immediate. Resistance was 
organized. Financial resources and material support were 
pledged to the revolutionaries. It was this response by 
the African powers that posed a threat to world peace in 
the early 1960's. This was especially true if Angola were 
to be used as a pawn' in the Cold War. 
On June 1, 1961, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana 
called the Accra Conference, which was attended by over 
two hundred nationalists from throughout Africa. The 
purpose of the Conference, according to the published 
agenda, was to plan "a decisive assault on imperialism.nlOO 
100TTFreedom Fighter's Conference in Accra, TT Africa 
Report, Vol. VII, No. 7 (July, 1962), p. 13. 
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Most of the meetines were secret, but the agenda indicated 
that discussion would be centered upon intensification of 
the struggle to gain independence for the Portuguese 
colonies, the vital role and need for concerted action and 
unity in the struggle, and the major problems confronting 
nationalist oreanizations and parties. At least partially 
as a result of this thinking, the Organization of African 
Unity became active in the Angolan rebellion. Angola was 
isolated as a target area to receive the OAU Liberation 
Committee's financial and material aid. Also, the Accra 
Conference chose to recognize one revolutionary party as 
the principal means of achieving self-determination, rather 
than attempting to support a multi-party system represent-
ing fragmented ideas and support. Hence, the OAU supported 
GRAE. Its multi-ethnic leadership and contact with the 
people at the village level made it the liberation party 
in the best position to achieve the goals of the OAU and 
the Accra Conference. 
The second conference of independent African 
states was held in Addis Ababa in 1960, and in 1962 the 
Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa 
was also held in the Ethiopian capital. The objectives 
of these conferences as they relate to the Angolan 
struggle were to unite the nationalist movements of these 
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areas and to promote closer association leading to federa-
tion from the Red Sea to the Cape.101 During the 
Addis Ababa Conference, Premier Khrushchev pledged his 
nation to the "full moral and material support" for the 
struggle of the peoples of Angola.102 This 11 pledge 11 
helped confirm suspicious and unofficial reports that the 
Soviet Union was supplying arms for the revolution, 
shipping them first to Ghana, whence they found their way 
to the Congo-Kinshasa and into rebel hands. There seems 
to be little doubt that the MPLA was receiving Communist 
technical and material aid through Congo-Brazzaville. 103 
This aid was allegedly routed from the Soviet Union and 
other communist bloc countries through Guinea and Algeria. 
There is some truth to the Portuguese claim that 
the revolt was partly the work of foreign agents and 
agitators. Certainly Radio Conakry in communist-leaning 
Guinea beamed broadcasts into Angola and communist agents, 
according to this source, were operating from Congo-
101John Hatch, A History of Postwar Africa 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), 
p. 3 54. 
102 11 African Liberation," The Mizan Newsletter, 
Vol. VI, No. 5 (May, 1964), p. 60. 
lOJsupra, p. 76. 
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Brazzaville across the border into Congo-Kinshasa, Cabinda, 
and Angola.104 
The relationship of Portugal with Rhodesia and the 
Republic of South Africa is not yet clear. Portugal has 
had close ties with Rhodesia since the 18$0Ts, but estab-
lished firmer ties with the Republic of South Africa only 
recently. Each of these countries employs a policy of 
racial discrimination that isolates it from the remainder 
of the world. This relationship can be expected to become 
closer as pressure increases and common support is needed 
for survival. This position was reiterated by Mr. H. Das 
Neves, mayor of Laurenco Marques, Mozambique, at a luncheon 
in his honor in Pretoria, South Africa.105 
The Iberian Pact also binds Portugal to Spain, 
another of the remaining colonial powers in Africa. TIIf 
the going gets really tough, Franco may be counted on to 
give aid, TT wrote Ramon Serrano Sun er, Foreign Minister and 
brother-in-law to Generallisimo Franco. 
Spain would view the taking of Portuguese colo-
nies as an act of war and it would be the duty 
of everyone to go and fight, against teB or a 
104nPortugalTs Ancient Empire," Reporter, Vol. XXIV, 
No. 4 (April 13, 1961), p. 22. (Hereinafter referred to as 
TrEmpire.") 
105 111ong Friendship Binds South Africa and Portugal," 
South African Digest, Vol. XIV, No. 14 (March 31, 1967), 
p. 23. 
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thousand • • . a d~ty not only to the fatherland 
but to the world.106 
However, since the Iberian Pact has been in effect since 
1939 and Spain elected not to intervene when Portugal lost 
Goa on the Indian sub-continent, perhaps the pact lacks 
force and will not in the future push the world into crisis •. 
The United Nations has attempted to become a vital 
force in altering the course in Angola and bringing about 
a peaceful settlement there; but, due to ap almost complete 
lack of Portuguese cooperation or recognition that the 
United Nations has a legitimate right to investigate the 
Angolan crisis, little has been gained. Numerous resolu-
tions and documents have been introduced; some have been 
debated and voted upon. In much of the deliberation, the 
East-West struggle was the background issue at stake. 
In April, 1961, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution which the United States supported that claimed 
Portugal had not accorded Angolans adequate opportunities 
for social, economic, and political advancement. Reforms 
were called for, especially the granting of self-determina-
tion to the territory.107 The United States voted in 
l06t1Empire," QE• cit., p. 23. 
107United Nations, General Assembly, "Declaration 
Calling for the Introduction of Measures and Reforms in 
Angola," A/RES/1603 (XV), Fifteenth Session (April 20, 
1961). 
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support of self-determination and published a bulletin 
s:upporting this decj_sion against adverse Portuguese 
opinion.log United Nations Resolution A/RES/lSOe called 
for a training program for territories under Portuguese 
administration and declared, over Portuguese protest, that 
Angola was a non-self-governing Territory, and hence, 
subject to UN jurisdiction. A/RES/1514 (XV) upheld the 
right of self-determination and independence and called 
for the cessation of "all armed action or repressive 
measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples.nl09 
The Assembly also recognized that the denial of the rights 
of peoples under colonial subjugation to self-determination 
constituted a threat to the well-being of humanity and to 
international peace. Resolution A/1542 attempted to force 
Portugal to comply with Resolution A/1514, but the 
Portuguese position remained unaltered--Angola was an in-
tegral part of Portugal; therefore, problems there were 
internal and of no concern to the United Nations. 
The Assembly attempted to draw attention to the 
considered judgment of the General Assembly in Resolution 
lOestate Department Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1170, 
(November 27, 1961); unnumbered. 
109United Nations, General Assembly, "Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples," A/RES/1514 (XV), Fifteenth Session, December 14, 
1960. 
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1514 (XV) that the process of liberation was irresistible. 
Tilt is too much to hope that the nationalist sentiments 
aroused in the Angolan population and the desire for 
change will subside, and that the 'status quo' can be 
re-established.!1110 
The policy of the.United States is somewhat ob-
scured by political reality, our dedication to self-
determination on the one hand, and our NATO alliance with 
our Western anti-communist neighbors on the other. Foreign 
observers not fruniliar with the American political system 
must view our pronouncements as somewhat inconsistent. 
For exrunple, after the collapse of the summit conference 
in May, 1960, President Eisenhower visited President 
Salazar in Lisbon and stated that the United States and 
Portugal !!have worked together without a single difference 
of opinion.nlll With a change of administration in 1960, 
Portueal noticed a change in our attitude toward the 
African states. Portugal believed that the United States 
was in a popularity contest, seeking votes at the United 
Nations. They were also seized by the suspicion that the 
Kennedy Administration was motivated by policies that 
llOuN A/4978, QI?.• cit., P• 46. 
111 ''Kingdom of Silence," 2.£· ci!!_., p. Jl. 
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would win for him the support of the Negro in the United 
States. In 1961, Vice-President Johnson made a 28,500-
mile trip to explain the American cause to the world. He 
explained that 
The United States must and will commit the full 
strength of its great capacity, the full moral 
force of our devotion to peace, the full energy 
and vitality of our peoplei to the cause of 
human freedom everywhere.l 2 
An Angolan might reflect on democracy in the United States 
and wonder about the napalm bombs being supplied to 
Portugal by the United States through NATO and used in 
Angola. Perhaps the United States reasons that it cannot 
show the full moral force of its devotion to the cause of 
human freedom everywhere because of the politics of the 
Cold War. Africans will find this reasoning difficult 
to understand. 
11211Deeds, Not Words, 11 Nation, Vol. 192, No. 20 
(May 20, 1961), p. 421. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PROSPECTS OF ANGOLAN NATIONALISM 
Portugal is a proud nation, proud of having been 
the first country to penetrate Africa and open it to 
European trade and influence. Portugal also clings tena-
ciously to past glories, dating to the exploits and philoso-
phies of Prince Henry. The Portuguese are quite aware that 
theirs is not only the oldest, but the last of the great 
empires of the "old 11 world. 
The Portuguese were not the only colonial power to 
believe it had a 11 civilizing11 mission and 11white man's burd-
en," but they are the only power that has attempted to 
transform their colonies into provinces totally integrated 
sociologically with the mother country. In addition, 
Portugal has neither promised independence to its colonies 
nor prepared them for it. 
The government of President Salazar has made no 
promises to the indigenous populations, nor has he set in 
motion the machinery that will someday evolve into sover-
eignty for the colonies, because Portugal feels she cannot 
afford to. Portugal's economic dependence on its empire, 
and especially Angola, is literally a matter of life and 
death. With its empire, Portugal is a "nation" of twenty 
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million people with nearly a million square miles of area, 
a balanced budget, and a highly protected market for its 
exports. Without the empire, Portugal would be a country 
of barely over nine million people, with an area of thirty-
five thousand square miles, a considerable annual trade 
deficit, and a depressed economy that inevitably would 
lower what is already the lowest standard of living in 
western Europe. 
These factors, linked to the mystique of Prince 
Henry's "civilizing" mission, illustrate why the world can 
expect Portugal to cling to its policies with dogged 
determination. This is not to say, however, that these 
policies are not irrevocable. There are elements inside 
Portugal, repressed, that are in profound disagreement 
with the politics of their government. Ex-General 
Humberto Delgado and Henrique Galvao are exiled leaders 
who represent strong anti-government feelings. In 1958, 
the first election where candidates were permitted to 
oppose the official government slate, Delgado polled 
236,528 votes while America Tomas, the government candi-
date, polled 758,998.113 In Angola where only 0.7% of 
113Peter Fryer and Patricia M. Pinheiro, Oldest 
Ally (London: Dobson Books, Lt.ct., 1961), p. 188. 
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the population was eligible to vote, Delgado received 
10,300 votes while Tomas received 22,300.114 The .size of 
this protest vote is significant, especially since the 
election was controlled. The hijacking of the Santa 
Maria by Henrique Galvao was also a violent protest 
against the policies of the Portuguese government. With 
the overthrow of the government, the political policies 
inside Portugal could abruptly change. This change could 
be equally abrupt for the colonies. 
The role of the Western democracies probably will 
not change--the primary interest in Angola's struggle will 
be as it affects NATO or the Cold War balance of power. 
The governments and parties of the West look upon the human 
and universal aspects of democratic principles from vantage 
points much too dehumanized to allow for a commitment to 
the rights of the suffering Angolan citizen. This position 
by default leaves a vacuum within which communist countries 
and groups can operate relatively free from competition. 
The role of the United Nations will be relatively 
inflexible. Portugal is not to remain in Africa indefi-
nitely. This inflexibility will not bring the world 
114Ibid., p. 178. · 
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organization and Portugal together to resolve their 
differences unless one or the other alters appreciably 
its present position. This is unlikely! The official 
United Nations position has not changed since 1960, when 
General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) declared without 
dissent: 
. that the subjugation of peoples to alien 
subjugation, domination, and exploitation consti-
tutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is 
contrary to the United Nations Charter, and is 
an impediment to the promotion of world peace 
and cooperation. Immediate steps are to be 
taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of 
those territories without any conditions or 
reservations, in accordance with their freely 
expressed will and desire, without any distinc-
tion as to race, creed, or colour, in order to 
enable them to enjoy complete independence and 
freedom.115 
Some Portuguese are hopeful that their accultura-
tion policy can continue long enough to bring about the 
lfBrazilian solution." This "solutionlf would recognize 
independence for Angola; however, Angola would assume 
membership in an international Lusitanian cultural com-
munity.116 This "solution" would conflict with the funda-
mental aspects of Pan-African nationalism with which the 
principal rebel organizations identify. 
115uN A/1514 (XV) (December 14, 1960). 
116victor C. Ferkiss, Africa's Search for Identity 
(New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1966), p. 201. 
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The OAU 1 s program demands an end to Portuguese 
domination in Angola and self-determination and indepen-
dence for its people. Military operations are to cease, 
and all acts of repression against the Angolan people 
halted. The OAU also demands an "unconditional political 
amnesty 11 and free functioning political parties.117 Free 
elections and a peaceful transfer of power to the elected 
Angolan representatives is the ultimate goal of the OAU 
program. 
The OAU asks all countries to halt assistance to 
Portugal which may be used to fight Angolan revolutionary 
organizations and hinder the just aspirations of the 
people. 
Occasionally, the Portuguese press emphasizes 
educational and political reforms which are to ameliorate 
the wrongs of the system. For example, citizenship has 
now been granted to all Angolans. The crop quota system 
has been abolished. The educational system has been ex-
panded to permit a more adequate education for all Angolan 
children. It should be clear, however, that rebel politi-
cal processes have matured to a point where independence 
117"The OAU's 'Operation Liberation, ' 11 Africa 
Report, Vol. VIII, No. 8 (August, 1963), p. 16. 
102 
is the only permanent solution to the Portugal-Angola 
problem. Reforms can no longer bridge the gap between 
the opposing forces·! 
Independence for Angola is, therefore, inevitable. 
The major concern, then, is the status of the new leaders 
and the extent to which Angolans look to them for their 
leadership. The picture for Angola is not a happy one. 
The Portuguese government has not prepared the Angolan 
for independence, and the economic, political, and educa-
tional structure Angola will inherit when independence is 
won will not be staf~ed by people adequately trained to 
prevent a general condition of mayhem. 
One might also address himself to the question 
of Angolan nationalism. Does it truly exist? The 
Kikongos envision a restoration of the Kongo Kingdom, 
unification with the Bakongos, and severance from Angola 
as an independent state. In the south, the Cuanhamas 
argue th&t independence will reinstate a political status 
pre-dating Portuguese intrusion. Most tribal groups in 
Angola did not actively support the efforts of GRAE-UPA, 
the MPLA, or UNITA, and tribal divisions will be a 
formidable obstacle to Angolan unification.118 GRAE made 
llSDr. G. Wesley Johnson, Professor of African 
History, private interview held at Stanford University, 
August, 1967. ·(Hereinafter referred to as G. W. Johnson.) 
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the greatest inroads toward providing multi-tribal leader-
ship; however, primary support came from the Kikongo and 
Kimbundu tribes. GRAE had difficulty overcoming the 
image of fighting to reunite the Bakongo nation. The MPLA 
competed with GRAE for support from the same ethnic area. 
UNITA attempted to expand its revolutionary support to the 
Lunda tribes· bu·t with very limited success. Therefore, 
whatever support that GRAE, MPLA, or UNITA received came 
from northern Angola. (See Map 5.) The effectiveness 
of each organization was greatly reduced because of their 
intense competition with one another. Tribes located in 
the central and southern regions of Angola never supported 
the revolt and the northern tribes were fragmented "to a 
point where unification after eight years ·of fighting a 
'common' cause was impossible. 11119 If this fravnented 
nationalism constitutes a true assessment of the Angolan 
situation, the tribes can be expected to splinter after 
sovereignty is achieved. 
Perhaps, with all factors weighed, Angola is not 
experiencing nationalism in the countryside, but is 
ll 9rv1r. Lea'O Lo:i:-enzo, Special Adviser of the 
Portugal Mission to the United Nations, private interview 
held at the United Nations, New York, July, 1968. 
lOli. 
"suffering" from elitism. The revolutionary leadership 
is made up of a Western-educated minority that may not 
have communicated effectively with the masses. Once inde-
pendence is won, the masses may fragment and rise up 
against the elitist leadership.120 The extent that 
elitism exists poses a danger to the success of the xevo-
lution. There is always this danger if leadership does 
not rise organically from the people. If the Angolan 
rebel leadership is elitist, it does not detract from 
their sincerity, dedication, or commitment, however. The 
sincerity of the elite is not a question; the wisdom of 
the creation of an elitis.t leadership is what must be 
placed in question. 
The eventual control of the revolution may well 
slip from the hands of the elite and terminate with 
individuals not yet prominent in rebel leadership ranks. 
Because MPLA leader Mario de Andrade, as a communist 
sympathizer, has permitted numerous communists to infil-
trate the ranks of that body, it may well become a communist 
frontal organization.121 If the MPLA were to become 
120G. W. Johnson 
121Dr. Peter Duignan, Curator, African Section, 
Hoover Library, an interview held at Stanford University 
August, 1967. · ' 
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dominated by the Communist Party as Dr. Duignan suggests, 
it will not have meant that the revolution at its incep-
tion was communist or even leftist. If it should ever be, 
however, it will serve notice to the Western world of its 
long indifference and ignorance of this problem. · 
Portugal, too, must recognize that it must accede 
to the demands of its allies, the United States and Great 
Britain, that independence must be recognized as a right 
and be granted to the Angolan people.122 Portugal is 
clinging to an age, fading, that will soon be no more. 
By attempting to perpetuate this anachronistic machine, 
the world's oldest Western empire is heading toward 
oblivion. 
122 Anthony Verrier, ''Portugal on the Brink, 11 
New Statesman, Vol. LXIV, No. 1649 (October 19, 1962), 
p. 518. 
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APPENDIX I 
GLOSSARY OF PORTUGUESE TERMS 
Literally, an assimilated person. 
Under the Statute of 1954 this term was 
used to designate an African who had 
obtained the status and rights of a 
full Portuguese citizen. 
Caderneta (indigena) Identity card issued to non-
assimilated Africans. Commonly referred 
to as "work-booklf or "native work-book." 
Chef e de posto 
Con to 
Contract Labor 
Escudo 
Indigena 
Official in charge of a sub-area called 
a posto. 
Portuguese unit of currency (1 conto -
1000 escudos). 
Africans recruited, under the supervi-
sion of local administrators, to work 
on private or public projects, often 
outside the region in which they nor-
mally reside, for a specified contracted 
time period, with the maximum time 
limit on contracts two years inside 
Angola and three years outside. 
Portuguese unit of currency. The parity 
of the Portuguese escudo in terms of 
United States dollars is Esc. 28.75 = 
$US1. 
Under the Statute of 1954, it was used 
as a legal term desi,snating an individual 
living in accordance with tribal ways, 
i. e., non-assimilated African. Also 
used in Portuguese in a more general 
sense to mean African or "native." 
Used in the report as an adjective to 
qualify the special status of indige-
nous inhabitants. (Indigene - plural 
form.) 
Liceu 
Obligatory Labor 
Voluntary Labor 
112 
Secondary school. 
Africans compelled to work on public 
works of general and collective interest, 
the results of which will benefit them, 
to fulfill judicial sentences of a 
penal character, and to fulfill fiscal 
obligations. This means that Africans 
may be requisitioned to work on public 
projects whenever voluntary workers are 
not sufficient, or in disaster emergen-
cies. 
Africans who contract directly with an 
employer and work in the area in which 
they normally reside. The contract may 
be for varying lengths of time and is 
not under the direct supervision of the 
provincial administrator. 
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APPENDIX II 
EDUCATION STATISTICS* 
Government Private Total 
1958- 1958- 1958-
1955 1959 1955 1959 1955 1959 
Number of schools 
Primary 144 211 154 371 298 582 
Secondary: 
Liceu 2 5 18 26 20 31 
Technical prof. 5 10 5 5 10 15 
Indigenous education: 
Adaptation courses 837 814 158 243 995 1,057 
Elementary prof. 7 6 7 6 
Teacher training 1 2 1 2 
Other schools 13 13 
Total 996 1,061 335 645 1,331 1,706 
Number of students 
Primary 11,132 16,771 7,564 13,226 18,696 29,997 
Secondary 
Liceu 1,510 3,006 1,610 2,355 3,120 5,361 
Technical prof. 1,300 3,074 530 288 1,830 3,362 
Indigenous education: 
Adaptaion courses 35,938 41,866 12,310 13,913 48,248 55,779 
Elementary prof. 468 426 468 426 
Teacher-training 161 297 161 297 
Other schools 1,007 1,007 
Total 50,509 66,447 22,014 29,762 72,523 96,229 
*Source: Angola: Reparti~ao de Estatistica Geral, Annuario 
Estatistico, 1959 Luanda, 1960, p. 61. 
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ON THE EXISTENCE OF THREE SEPARATE AFRICAS 
I think we can and must say that there is not a single 
Africa; there are several Africas. We have the Arabic 
Africa, in the North, with its specific problems, its own 
traditions, its peculiar culture: and it is not possible to 
discover there anything fundamental, common to the other 
Africas. Then we have Africa, to the South of Sahara: the 
political, sociological, and economic problems it faces are 
typical, which separates them completely from those found in 
other areas. Finally we have the multiracial and pluri-
cultural Africa, and we can say with a certain amount of 
pride that in it is included, with its unique characteristics, 
Portuguese Africa. This theory of the three Africas does not 
mean a simple speculation, neither constitutes a theoretical 
interpretation with political aims. On the contrary: it is 
based on a reality that is becoming progressively more pro-
found, it is the result of an experience that becomes clearer 
day by day. Though it may look paradoxal, the political ties 
created by XIX Century Europe were what gave a seeming unity 
to Africa; so when those were broken or transformed, the 
reality took again its rights, which are imposing themselves 
with growing force. This means it is artificial to try to 
impose on the whole of Africa the same political and econo-
mic solutions, to face its sociological evolution with the 
same standards, to defend a unity of action that does not 
correspond to a unity of values or interests. One thing is 
cooperation, which is always useful and must be established 
on large bases, and another thing is uniformity, that 
suffocates and kills regional values whose loss constitutes 
damage to Africa itself. If those who have some responsi-
bility for African policy, or who have some means of influ-
encing it, wanted to see and to accept the reality of the 
three Africas and to act accordingly, we are sure that many 
benefits would result from it to the continent and that the 
solution of many basic problems would be found more easily. 
As far as we are concerned, we have said and repeated, and 
we keep saying it and repeating that we are ready to cooper-
ate within the principles of equality and mutual respect. 
And we also keep saying that from us Africa has nothing to 
fear, and only extreme demagogy or obedience to interests 
of others can one think and say the opposite. 
(Dr. Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Press Conference, held in Lisbon, June 2, 
1964) 
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LEGISLATIVE DECREE No. 39666 ON THE STATUS OF INDIGENOUS PERSONS 
OF PORTUGUESE NATIONALITY IN TH.E PROVINCES OF PORTUGUESE 
GUINEA, ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQ1JE 
of 20 May 19541 
CHAPTER I.-INDIGENOFS PERS00:S OF 
PORTUGUESE NATIONALITY AND THEIR 
STATUS 
Art. 1. In accordance with the Pulitical Con-
stitution,2 the organic law rcbting to the Portuguese 
overseas pro\•inccs 3 and the present cn::ictment, the 
indigenous inhahitants of the provinces of Portuguese 
Guinea, Angola and Moz~1mbique shall enjoy a special 
status. 
Sole paragr,lj!h. The status of an indigt.:nous person 
of Portuguese nationality shall be personal and shall 
be rdlcctt.:<l in wh:itcver Portuguese territory the 
person possessing it m~1r be in. 
Art. 2. A person shall he considered to be an 
indigenous inhabitant of a province aforementioned 
if he is a member of the negro race or a descrndant 
of a member of that race and was born, or habitually 
resides, in the province hut docs not as yet possess 
the level of education or the personal and social habits 
which an.· a condition for the unrestricted ::ipplic:1tion 
of the public ::ind private bw pertaining to Portuguese 
citizens. 
Sole paragraph. A person shall likewise be considered 
to be an indigenous inhabitant of the prO\·ince if he 
was born of indigrnous p::irents at a place outsiJe the 
province to which his p:irents had temporarily 
remon·d. 
Art. 3. Unless otherwise prescribed by law, 
indigenous persons shall be governed by the us::igcs 
and customs pertaining to their respective societies. 
(1) Toleration of indigenous usages and customs 
shall be subject to such limitations as ::ire imposed by 
1 Text in Ditfrio do Gnvernn, Series I, No. 110, of 20 /\fay 
1954, rcctivcJ through th<· L·ourtcsy of the Portuguese 
Embassy, Washington, D.C. Translation by the L'nitcJ 
Nations Secretariat. 
1 Sec Tearboo.~ on Human Rigbtr for 1951, p. 301. 
3 Sec Tearbonk o;i Jlum,111 Rigbtr for 1953, pp. 327-329. 
morality, the dictates of humanity and the higher 
interest of the free exercise of Portuguese sovereignty. 
(2) In applying indigenous usages and customs, 
the authorities shall endeavour, whenever possible, 
to bring them into conformity with the fundamental 
principles of public and private Portuguese law, and 
shall encourage the progressive evolution of indigenous 
institutions in h:irmony with those principles. 
(3) The extent to which indigenous usages and 
customs are to be applied shall be determined by the 
stage of development reached by the indigenous 
person concernc<l, his moral character and his occu-
pational attainments and by whether he is estranged 
from, or still integratc<l in, tribal society. 
.. -lrt. 4. The State shall endeavour by every means 
to impron-, both m::iterially and morally, the living 
conditions of the indigenous inhabitants, to develop 
their natural aptitudes and abilities, and, in general, 
to educate them by providing them with instruction 
and hy transforming their primitive usages and 
customs, directing their activities into useful channels 
and actiYdy integrating them into the community 
by gi,·ing them access to citizenship. 
.'lrt. 5. The State shall providc all assistance 
necessary for improving the health and increasing the 
life span of the indigenous peoples and for introducing 
new production techniques into the indigenous 
economy. 
Art. 6. The instruction especially intended for 
indigenous persons shall have as its general· purpose 
the moral, civic, intellectual and physical education 
prescribed by law and the imparting of work habits 
and work skills, :is determined by the needs of both 
~l·xcs and by social and regional cconomic conditions. 
(1) Tht: instruction refrrred to in this article shall 
always be din:cted towards inculcating a knowledge 
of the Portuguese language, but the use of the ver-
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nacubr languages may be authorizcd as a m<.:ans to 
that end. 
(2) Those indigenous persons who h:n-c received 
"adaptation" tr:iining or who demonstratt~, in the 
manner prescribed by law, th:1t they do not require 
such training, sldl be assured of admission to public 
schools under the conditions applicable to other 
Portuguese n:itionals. 
CHAPTER IL-LEGAL STATUS OF 
INDIGENOUS PERSONS 
PART I 
Art. 23. Indigenous persons shall not be granted 
political rights with n:spect to non-indigenous insti-
tutions. 
Sole paragraph. Representatives of the indigenous 
in!tabitants, chosen in the manner prescribed by law, 
sh:ill sit in the lcgishtive or government councils of 
each province. 
Art. 24. Indigenous pcrsons sh:ill have the right 
of petition and complaint, which thcy rmy exercise 
at all administrative lcn~ls and in particubr with 
regard to administrators of indigenous affairs and 
administrative inspectors. 
Sole paragraph. It shall be a disciplinary offence for 
any overseas official to attempt any obstruction or 
reprisal with regard to the exercise by indigenous 
persons of the right confi.:rred by this article. 
PART II 
Art. 25. In the absrnce of explicit kgisbti\·e 
provisions concerning indigenous pc:rsons, the pro-
visions of ordinary criminal law shall apply. 
Sole paragraph. A judge, when assessing an offender's 
conduct and imposing penalty, shall in every instance 
take into consideration the influence exerted on thl: 
s:iid offrnJer and his actions by indigcnous social 
conditions. 
PART III 
Sub-part I 
Art. 30. Baptizl:d indigenous pl:rsons m:iy be 
married'aceording to the provisions of canon bw by 
a ministry of the Roman Catholic Church if thq 
satisfy the requirements of the civil bw. 
Art. 31. The ownership of movable property shall 
be acknowledged and protected in accorJ:incc with 
the general provisions of la\1·. 
Sub-part II 
Art. 32. The State shall endeavour to te:ich the 
indigenous peoples that work is an inJispcn,ablc 
clement of progress, but the authorit[e; rn:1y not 
impose labour except in the cases explicitly prescribed 
by law. 
,drt. 33. Indigenous persons may freely choose 
the work they wish to perform, whether for their 
own or for another's account, on their own land or 
on land allotted to them for this purpose. " 
Art. 34. The performance of work for non-
indigcnous pcrsorh sldl he subject to freedom of 
contnct and to the right to fair pay and assistance, 
and shall be supcn·ist:d by the State through competent 
authorities. 
Sub-part III 
.drt. 35. Indigenous pt:rsons living in a tribal 
organiz:ition shall be assured of the joint use and 
enjoyment, in the manner prescribed by customary 
law, of the land necessary for their settlement and 
for the growing of their crops and the grazing of their 
c:itde. 
Sole paragr,1ph. Occup:1tion of land as provided in 
this article docs not confer indiYidual rights of owner-
ship and shall be go\·erned, as between indigenous 
persons, by the rele\·ant usages and customs. 
Art. 36. No grants of bnd may be made to non-
indigenous persons unless the position of the indigenous 
inhabitants established thereon h:ive been protected 
as prescribed by law. 
Art. 37. The State shall recognize and foster 
individual rights of indigenous persons o\·er rural and 
urban propcrtit·s. 
Indigenous persons who have opted for ordinary 
bw in the m:itter of immovable property may acquire 
rights of ownership and other rights in rem over 
immovable property through inheritance, legacy, gift 
or purchase. 
An indigenous person who has not so opted m:iy 
acquire rights OYer immo\·ablc property subject to 
the limitations imposcd by the following articles. 
Sole paragraph. Any contract for the purchase of 
immovable property in which the purchaser is an 
indigenous person, ;ind any disposal by way of gift, 
s::ile or otherwise of immovable property belonging 
to an indig..:nous person, where such dispos::il is in 
favour of :i non-indigenous person, shall be valid only 
if authorized by the local judge, who shall ascertain 
that the indigenous persons concerned have the 
necessary legal cap:tcity anti that tht·ir interests will 
not bl: injured. 
CHAPTER Ilf.-TERl\IINATION OF THE 
STATUS OF INDIGENOUS PERSON AND 
ACQQISITION OF CITIZENSHIP 
A1·t. 56. A person may relinquish the status ·of 
indigenous person and acquire citizenship if he can 
L .... 
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prove that he satisfies all the: following requirements: 
(a) Is over eighteen years of age; 
(b) Speaks the Portuguese bnguage correctly; 
(c) Is engaged in an occupation, trade or craft from 
which he derives sufficient iw~ome to support himself 
an<l the dependent members of his family, or else 
possesses adequate resources for that purpose; 
(tf) Is of good conduct and has attained the level. 
of education and acquired the habits which arc a 
condition for the unrestricted application of tht: public 
and private law pertaining to Portuguese citizens; 
(e) Is not on record as having refused to perform 
military service or as having deserted. 
(1) Evidence of compliance with the foregoing 
requirements sliall be furnished in the form prescribed 
by law, but in the case of items (b), (c), and (tf) a 
certificate from the administrator of the municipality 
or circumscription in which thc indigenous pcrson 
concerned has been rcsiclent for the past three years 
shall be sufficicn t. 
As to evidence of good conduct, the certificate in 
question must be supplemented by an extract from 
tht: register of criminal oflcnces showing th:.:t the 
person concerned h:is never been sentenced to im-
prisonment and h::is not been sentenced to detention 
on more th::in two occ:isions. 
(2) In c::ise of refusal by an administr::itor to grant 
the relcvant certificates, an appeal may be lod17,cd 
with the ::iuthorities referred to in article 58 of this 
legislative decree, who shall render a fin:il decision in 
the matter after ordering such investigation as they 
consider appropriate. 
(3) For the purposes of granting citizenship, a 
notation of refusal to perform military service sh3Jl 
be deemed to be without effect if military servic is 
subsequently performed. · 
Art. 57. An indigenous woman married - to . a 
person who acquires citizenship in pursuance of the 
preceding article and any legitimate or legitimated 
children under eighteen years of age living with the 
father at the date when citizenship \vas acquired r11ay 
also acquire citizenship if they satisfy the requirements 
set out in items (b) and (d) of article 56. 
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DECREE No, 18:570, July 8, 1930, Portuguese Colonial Act, 
Chapter II 
Article 15: The State shall guarantee the protection 
and defense of the natives in the colonies, in accordance 
with the principles of humanity and sovereignty, the pro-
visions of this Chapter and the international conventions at 
present in force or which may come into force. The colonial 
authorities shall prevent and penalize all abuses against 
the persons and possessions of natives in accordance with 
the law. 
Article 16: The State shall establish public insti-
tutions and encourage the creation of private ones to 
support the rights of natives or render them assistance. 
The institutions in either case shall be Portuguese. 
Article 17: The law shall guarantee to the natives, 
under the terms stated therein, ownership and possession of 
their lands and crops and this principle must be respected 
in all concessions granted by the State. 
Article 18: The labour of natives in the service of 
the State or in that of administrative bodies shall be 
remunerated. 
Article 19: The following shall be prohibited: 
(1) All regulations according to which the State undertakes 
to furnish native labourers to any enterprises working for 
their own economic development. (2) All regulations 
according to which the natives existing in any territorial 
circumscription may be compelled to furnish labour to the 
said enterprises under any pretext whatever. 
Article 20: The State may only compel natives to 
labour on public works of general benefit to the community, 
in occupations the results of which will be enjoyed by them, 
in execution of judicial decisions of a penal character or 
for the fulfillment of fiscal obligations. 
Article 21: Regulations relating to the contracting 
of native labour shall be based on the liberty of the indi-
vidual and on the right to a fair wage and assistance, the 
public authorities intervening only for purposes of super-
vision. 
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Article 22: Attention shall be paid in the colonies 
to the stage of evolution of the native populations, and 
there shall be special statutes for natives, which, under 
the authority of Portuguese public and private law, shall 
lay down juridical regulations for them in keeping with their 
individual, domestic, and social usages and customs, pro-
vided that these are not incompatible with morality and 
dictates of humanity. 
Article 23: The State shall ensure to all its over-
seas territories liberty of conscience and the free exercise 
of the various religions, subject to the restrictions neces-
sitated by the rights and interests of the sovereignty of 
Portugal and the maintenance of public order, and so long as 
they are in harmony with international treaties and conven-
tions. 
Article 24: Religious missions overseas, being 
instruments of civilization and national influence, and 
establishments for the training of personnel for service in 
them and in the Portuguese Padroado, shall possess a juri-
dical character and shall be protected and assisted by the 
States as institutions of learning. 
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TEXT OF RESOLUTION 
'I'he General Assembly, 
Having considered the situation in Angola, 
Recalling its resolution 1603 (XV) of 20 April 1961 
and the Security Council resolution of 9 June 1961, 
Having examined the report of the Sub-Committee on 
the situation in Angola appointed under resolution 1603 (XV), 
Deploring the lack of co-operation and assistance by 
Portugal in the full and effective discharge of the Sub-
Commi ttee' s task as called for in the aforementioned 
resolutions, 
Noting with deep regret Portugal's refusal to recog-
nize Angola as a Non-Self-Governing Territory and its failure 
to take measures to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 
(XV) of 14 December 1960 entitled "Declaration on the grant-
ing of independence to colonial countries and peoples", 
Convinced that the continued refusal of Portugal to 
recognize the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan people 
to self-determination and independence constitutes a 
permanent source of international friction and threatens 
international peace and security, 
1. Expresses its appreciation of the work of the 
Sub-Committee on the situation in Angola and commends to 
the Portuguese Government, for urgent consideration and 
effective implementation, the observations, findings and 
conclusions set out in the Sub-Committee's report; 
2. Solemnly reaffirms the inalienable right of the 
Angolan people to self-determination and independence; 
3. Deeply deprecates the repressive measures and 
armed action against the people of Angola and the denial to 
them of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and calls 
upon the Portuguese authorities to desist forthwith from 
repressive measures against the people of Angola; 
4. Appeals to the Government of Portugal to release 
immediately all Angolan political prisoners wherever they 
may be held; 
5. Urges the Government of Portugal to undertake, 
without further delay, extensive political, economic and 
social reforms and measures and in particular to set up 
freely elected and representative political institutions with 
a view to transfer of power to the people of Angola; 
6. Decides to continue the Sub-Committee on the 
situation in Angola appointed under resolution 1603 (XV): 
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(a) To continue the performance of its tasks; 
(b) To study ways and means to secure the implemen-
tation of the present resolution and to report thereon to 
the Security Council and to the General Assembly; 
7. Requests Member States to use their influence to 
secure the compliance of Portugal with the present resolu-
tions; 
8. Requests all States Members of the United Nations 
and members of the specialized agencies to deny to Portugal 
any support and assistance which may be used by it for the 
suppression of the people of Angola; 
9. Requests the Government of Portugal to submit a 
report to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session on 
the measures it has undertaken in the implementation of the 
present resolution; 
10. Recommends to the Security Council, in the light 
of the Council's resolution of 9 June 1961 and of the present 
resolution, to keep the matter under constant review. 
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DECLARATION OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF 
UNIAO DAS POPULACOES DE ANGOLA (UPA) 
~ 
The Union of the Populations of Angola, conscious of 
its responsibility and the rights of the peoples of Angola, 
declares that it is devoted in its activities to the realiza-
tion and acquisition of the immediate independence of the 
people, moreover to its acquisition by pacific and democratic 
means. It will spare itself no sacrifice. In consequence: 
Peasants, Unemployed, Forced Laborers, your duty is 
clear. You are the most downtrodden. It is you who suffer 
most from colonial oppression. That is why you have the 
greatest interest in the re-establishment of the Angolan 
nation. For the past five centuries your ancestors, your 
parents and you, yourselves, have been condemned to exert all 
your efforts for the enrichment of only the Portuguese 
colonialists. You create the riches but you have not the 
right to profit from them. Your sweat is the grease of the 
colonist/ your blood is sucked by the colonial vampire, and 
you are left to languish in misery and humiliation. 
The Union of the Populations of Angola formally 
pledges to bring an end to this mortal sickness of the terri-
tory of Angola. It calls on you all to contribute to the 
liquidation of Portuguese colonialism in the national terri-
tory of Angola. 
Women. The women of Ghana, Guinea, Cameroons, Togo, 
Congo, and Somaliland all participated in the heroic combat 
against colonialism. The hour is past when the women re-
mained at their firesides and were mere spectators of events. 
Your husbands are not paid, your children are not fed or 
given schooling; they serve only as machines to permit the 
colonists to live an increasingly easy life at the cost of 
the misery of the peoples of Angola. You have the same rights 
as the men. The Union of the Populations of Angola is deter-
mined to establish a democratic regime which will, without 
distinction of sex, permit each individual to develop his 
personality and contribute to the development and productivity 
of the Angolan nation. 
Most of the time now you are requisitioned and forced 
to work on forced labor projects. The pitiless colonialist 
beast requires of you the most inhuman and vile labor. The 
Union of the Populations of Angola considers that this 
scandal has lasted too long already, that the hour has struck 
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when you should have a respectable and dignified lot in life. 
Wherever you are: organize, prepare to take up and spread 
the orders of the Union of the Populations of Angola. 
Erase fear and submission from your lives. You must 
prove to the occupying power that you are conscious of the 
justice of your cause. 
Tribal Chiefs. Certainly your position is difficult. 
For a long time you have unknowingly served the colonialist 
interests and permitted the exploitation of the people. 
Although your mission as chiefs was to protect and serve the 
people of Angola. Certain members of your group have become 
instruments of colonialism. They have permitted the recruit-
ment of forced laborers and have su-ported the policy of heavy 
taxation, and in a great portion of Angola their position has 
made them traitors. 
The Union of the Populations of Angola is not ignorant 
of the terrible pressures you have suffered from colonialism, 
but it knows also that at this time, when a great movement is 
shaking Africa, you must not stand idly by. You must fully 
realize that the moment has come for you to make your choice 
between your country, your sons, your brothers on the one 
hand, and the colonists on the other. That is why we ask 
you to think carefully. 
During the year 1960, all the African peoples are to 
unite their efforts for the eviction of colonialism from 
Africa. The African peoples and the people of Angola will 
be pitiless for the men who have not been able to choose the 
side of justice and truth. From today onward, the people 
are judging you. All that you do against the people will be 
held against you. This is no longer the time when a chief 
could be ordered by a European and blindly strike and punish 
his subjects at any moment and under any circumstances. The 
end of the arbitrary has come. You must understand. 
Youth. You are the seeds of Angola, it is toward you 
that we all turn our hopes and our concerns. It is to you 
that we all look for new values, values which will bring 
Angola's voice to be heard immediately in the concert of 
nations. 
You must develop your national conscience and your 
human conscience. You must erase from your soul all traces 
of inferiority complex. You must no longer permit yourselves 
to be beaten down; you must take in your hands the destiny of 
your land and of your people. And you must stand ready as the 
determined reserves to come to the aid of your elder brothers 
who are so enthusiastically setting in motion the battle for 
national liberation. 
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Portuguese Colonists. The Union of the Populations 
of Angola is not the enemy of the Portuguese, but it is 
against a system of spoliation which robs our land of all 
existence as a nation and which condemns 4,500,000 inhabi-
tants to illiteracy, humiliation, and famine. The Union 
of the Populations of Angola is fighting with all its force 
against this system. It begs you not to stand in opposition 
to the advance of history. 
Certain of your members have established colossal 
fortunes on the backs of the Angolans, They must be made to 
understand that the hour has come when they must make resti-
tution to the Angolans for their land and their resources, 
As for the others, the Union of the Populations of 
Angola tells them that they may remain in Angola in new found 
peace so that together we can work for the establishment of 
an Angolan Republic, democratic and socially just. 
Portuguese People. You know, you are not ignorant 
of the lamentatable state in which the people of Angola find 
themselves. Colonists who have come from Portugal, supported 
by the Army and a pitiless administration, have brought an 
unbelievable reign of terror to a population of 4,500,000 
people. 
The Union of the Populations of Angola calls upon all 
the democrats, workers, Christians, and men of good faith of 
Portugal to unite their efforts to work against this dis-
grace to the twentieth century, which dishonors and disgraces 
the name of Portugal. 
Portuguese State. The regime that the Union of the 
Populations of Angola will establish in Angola will be demo-
cratic. It will be democratic because the power will be 
exercised by the people for the people. It will be socially 
just because it will be exercised directly and specifically 
by the most needy masses. The lands will be distributed to 
those who work them. 
The Union of the Populations of Angola will abolish 
all the special privileges and exceptions established by 
your representatives. The women will also have the right of 
vote. 
Privileges will be abolished, eacH person shall have 
an equal right to education. Unemployment will be declared 
a national emergency and every force will erase this situation. 
Every man and every woman inhabitant in Angola, 
regardless of nationality, race, or religion, will have the 
same rights as individuals, and the same rights will be 
respected in relation to their belongings. 
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The emancipating movement of the colonial peoples 
is strongly developed. It has acquired extraordinary power 
in numbers and today is irresistible. 
Men who refuse to recognize and take into consider-
ation the prodigious wave of independence which is sweeping 
the world are unrealistic and irresponsible. 
The people of Africa, from Algeria to the Cape, have 
come to their feet with the cry and the warning: "Africa 
for the Africans." 
The Union of the Populations of Angola is certain 
that you will fulfill your responsibilities. As for our-
selves, we have already undertaken our own, and any resistance 
to the movement is destined to be a total failure. 
African Peoples. Our continent, which is in the 
shape of an interrogation point, has in its heart the destiny 
of all present day mankind. For so long in bondage, it is 
commencing to make its voice heard in the concert of nations. 
No African can remain indifferent to the existence of 
colonialism on our continent. Each one of us has a definite 
duty to perform: to liquidate the colonial regime, the 
colonialist spirit, the colonial ideal, and to establish 
democracy in Africa, to construct the United States of 
Africa on the foundation of the autonomy of democratic units 
which will compose it. 
Taking into consideration the resolutions adopted at 
the Congresses of Bandung, Cairo, Accra, Tunis, and Conakry, 
and taking into account the watchwords of Liberty, Indepen-
dence, and Action in Africa, the Union of the Populations of 
Angola is determined to join the African Anti-Colonialist 
Front and to join battle against Portuguese colonialism and 
continue the fight to total victory. It expects all the 
Independent African States to aid and support its movement 
unconditionally. It expects all men, all women, to give 
their full support for a free Africa as the common under-
taking of the 200,000,000 souls who make up the population 
of this great continent. 
International Opinion. The Union of the Populations 
of Angola pledges itself to spare no effort in bringing the 
occupying power which controls the human and economic interests 
of the Portuguese to a pacific solution. 
Are not the people of Angola essentially a peace-loving 
people? 
In spite of repression, torture, oppression, exploi-
tation, humiliation, in spite of slavery, the Angolan people 
have always given proof of absolute pacifism, not out of 
moral weakness, but because of their firm belief that be-
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tween men there is always the possibility of pacific solution 
to any problem. And today it is time for the Portuguese to 
respond to this call. 
The Union of the Populations of Angola calls the 
world to be its witness. 
The solidly entrenched camp of colonialism which is 
Angola today is a disgrace to all of humanity. It is the 
duty of every man worthy of the name to participate in the 
restoration of human dignity in Angola. 
The Union of the Populations of Angola calls upon all 
international organizations and bodies, for them to bring 
pressure on Portugal so that the regime of exploitation and 
willful genocide in Angola shall cease, and that the terri-
tory shall recover its independence of ancient days. 
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MAJOR PROGRAM OF MOVIMENTO POPULAR DE 
LIBERTA9AO DE ANGOLA (MPLA) 
In this hour the concrete and immediate enemies of 
the Angolan people are the Portuguese colonialists and their 
agents, who will use all measures--violence, assassination, 
Machiavellism and subterfuge, military force, political and 
economic power, and cultural obscurantism--to maintain their 
sovereignty in Angola and to continue to oppress and exploit 
the Angolan people. 
MPLA stands for the following program: 
1. Immediate and Complete Independence: Liquidation 
in Angola by all available means of Portuguese colonial rule 
and all traces of colonialism and imperialism. 
To fight in common with all the forces of Angolan 
patriots in a mass popular movement, in order that the 
Angolan people have the power to install in Angola a republi~ 
can and democratic regime on the basis of total independence. 
To abolish all the privileges which the colonial 
regime has conceded to the Portuguese nationals and to 
foreigners. 
The sovereignty of the Angolan state must belong 
entirely and uniquely to the Angolan people without distinc-
tions based on ethnic groups, class, age, political and 
religious beliefs. 
The Angolan nation will have the sacred and inviol-
able right of self-determination whether in political, 
economic, diplomatic, military, and cultural planning or in 
any other sphere. 
Revision of the Angolan position in all treaties, 
agreements, and alliances which Portugal contracted without 
the free consent of the Angolan people. 
A popular voluntary union with the purpose of liqui-
dating whatever tendency of imperialistic aggression and all 
the acts and works which prejudice the independence, sover-
eignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Angola. 
The establishment of peace in Angola, based on a 
program of social justice, and the recognition by other 
nations of the independence, sovereignty, unity, and terri-
torial integrity of Angola. 
2. National Unity: To guarantee equality to all 
ethnic groups in Angola and to reinforce their unity and to 
help bring about friendship among them. 
Absolute prohibition of all tendencies to divide the 
Angolan nation. 
To create conditions in Angola so that the thousands 
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of Angolans who were forced to leave the country because of 
cruel treatment by the colonial regime would return to 
Angola. 
Regions in which national minorities live in dense 
numbers and possess individual characters ought to become 
autonomous. 
Each nationality or tribe will have the right to use 
and develop its own language--written and spoken--and to 
conserve or recreate its cultural heritage. 
In the interest of the Angolan nation, economic and 
social solidarity must be instigated and developed as well 
as normal relations--in economic, social, and cultural 
planning--between all the autonomous regions and all the 
nationalisies or tribes in Angola. 
Freedom of movement for all Angolan citizens which 
does not encroach upon national boundaries. 
3. African Unity: Complete solidarity with all 
African peoples who are fighting for complete independence 
and against colonialism and imperialism, and in particular 
with the peoples and political movements which are fighting 
against Portuguese colonialism. 
To work for the unity of all the peoples of the 
continent of Africa on the basis of respect for liberty, 
dignity, and the right to develop their own political, 
economic, and social systems. 
Unity of all African countries based on popular will 
and expressed through democratic and peaceful means. 
Opposition of any move to annex or to pressure one 
country over another. 
In the process of uniting one or more African nations, 
it resists political, economic, social conquests upon the 
culture of the working class and the boundaries of each 
country. 
4. Democratic Regime: Republican, democratic, and 
secular government for Angola. 
To guarantee freedom of speech, conscience, belief, 
press, assembly, associations, housing, correspondence, etc., 
for all the Angolan people. 
All Angolan citizens--without distinction of nation-
ality or tribe, of sex, social classification, cultural 
background, profession, wealth, religious belief, or philo-
sophical convictions--will have the right to vote at the age 
of eighteen years and the right to be elected after twenty-
one years of age. 
Elections will be based on universal suffrage, equal, 
direct, and secret. 
The Assembly of the Angolan nation will be the supreme 
legislative body of the State. 
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All members of the Assembly will have parliamentary 
immunity, 
The Assembly will designate a coalition government 
which can effect a union among the various nationalities 
or tribes, social classes; and among the various political 
parties; and that the government will really express the 
will of the nation in favor of liberty and progress; and 
against political, economic, territorial, or cultural aliena-
tion to the advantage of foreigners. 
The government of the republic of Angola will be the 
supreme body and will exercise the executive power of the 
State. It will receive its power from the Assembly and will 
be responsible to that body. 
Each autonomous region will have the right to adopt 
methods particularly suited to its conditions, but not contra-
dictory to the general welfare of Angola. 
Africanization of all administrative machinery of the 
country. 
Guarantees of protection in accord with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights to all strangers who respect the 
laws in existence. 
5. Economic Reconstruction and Plan of Production: 
Economic development through planning stages. Transforma-
tion of Angola into a country which is modern, prosperous, 
vigorous, and economically and industrially independent. 
Agricultural development, with long-range planning, 
principally the abandoning of a one-crop system; increase in 
productivity and mechanization of agriculture. 
Founding and progressive development of commercial 
and industrial enterprises, of consumers, wholesale, and 
producer's cooperatives. Progressive building of heavy and 
light industries; the latter for the production of consumer 
goods. 
Exploration of the state of potential energy in the 
country. 
Restoration and development of traditional African 
industries. 
Abolition of economic privileges bestowed by the 
colonial regime upon Portuguese nationals and foreign commer-
cial houses. 
Development of communication and transport facilities. 
Protection of industry and private enterprise. 
Encouragement of industry and of private commerce which 
are useful to the progress and reinforcement of real inde-
pendence of the Angolan people. 
Development and vigorous activity of economic relations 
between cities and villages, with the idea of progressively 
improving rural conditions and the level of life of rural 
populations. 
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Effective implementation of a policy which considers, 
at the same time, the interests of employees and employers. 
Establishment of a National Bank and currency. 
Avoidance of inflation and creation of a stable currency. 
Control by the State for the best interest of all of 
foreign trade of Angola. Revision of the unfair agreement 
of Angola with Portugal. Combat the balance deficit of the 
commerce of Angola. A balancing of the books--of receipts 
and expenditures. 
Abolition of the fiscal system introduced by Portu-
guese colonialists and creation of a new fiscal system; just, 
rational, and simple. 
Price control and prohibition of speculations. 
6. Agrarian Reform: To introduce agrarian reform 
that will eliminate the existing injustices ~n relation to 
rural ownership; to liquidate private monopoly of special 
rural production which is contrary to the denationalization 
of the Angolan soil; to fulfill the principle: the land is 
for those who till the soil. 
Nationalization of land belonging to the enemy of 
the nationalist movement after immediate and complete inde-
pendence of Angola; of traitors and proven enemies of the 
independent and democratic Angolan state. 
Definition of the limits of private rural property, 
having in mind the rural situation of each locality. After 
revision of title on lands, the purchasing by the State, for 
a just price, lands which are owned beyond the limits 
established by law. 
Distribution of land to those who do not have it and 
to those who have insufficient acreage. The beneficiaries 
of land legally distributed will not have to pay to the 
expropriators and to the State. 
Protection of the right of conquest by farmers in the 
popular battle for an independent Angola. 
7. Just Social Politics and of Progress: The State 
ought to protect the rights of workers and farmers, and of 
all social strata who have actively defended the indepen-
dence of Angola; autonomy and unity of the Angolan people 
and territorial integrity of the country. 
Immediate abolition of the regime of forced labor. 
Respect for the independence of syndicates and legal 
organizations of workers. 
An eight-hour day and progressive application of new 
laws for the protection of workers. The State will fix a 
minimum wage scale and will guard the rigorous application 
of the principle, nequal salary for equal work,n without 
discrimination of sex, age, and ethnic origin of workers. 
Protection of churches, places and objects of worship 
of legal religious institutions. 
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In all planning--political, economic, social, and 
cultural-~women will have the same rights as men. Women and 
men are equal before the law. 
State assistance to maternity patients and to infants. 
Application of social assistance to all Angolan 
citizens deprived of means and victims of disease, or in 
situations of forced unemployment, or of old age or infirmity. 
Solution for unemployment. Work security for 
artisans, workers, functionaries, and for youths who complete 
their studies. 
Assistance to all citizens who are disabled because 
of active participation in combat. for the independence of 
Angola. Assistance to families whose members died for the 
liberation of the Angolan nation. 
8. Development of Instruction, Culture, and Educa-
tion: Prohibition of colonial and imperialistic culture and 
education. Reform of instruction in actual practice. 
Development of instruction, culture, and education in the 
service of liberty and of peaceful progress of the Angolan 
people. 
To combat vigorously and rapidly illiteracy through-
out the country. Public instruction will become the obliga-
tion of the State and will be under its direction. 
To progressively establish compulsory and free 
primary education. To develop secondary technical-profes-
sional schools and to establish higher education. 
Establishment of cultural relations with foreign 
countries. Formation and perfection of technical units 
necessary to the building up of the nation. To give impetus 
to the study of the sciences, technology, letters, and arts. 
To institute in rural areas, efficient and adequate 
medical and sanitary aid for rural populations. Equal 
development on a national scale of medical and sanitary 
assistance. 
Elimination of prostitution and alcoholism. 
Stimulation and support of progressive youth activi-
ties. To support and protect, throughout the country, 
physical culture. 
9. National Defense: Establishment of an army for 
national defense, with sufficient power, intimately linked 
with the people and commanded wholly by Angolan citizens. 
To arm, equip, and unqualifiedly train an army. 
To install and unify new military and political instruction 
for the army. To establish democratic relations between 
officers and enlisted men. To consolidate discipline. Within 
the army to develop and create a national conscience, and to 
combat all regional tendencies. 
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Prohibition of foreign military bases on the national 
territory. 
10. Independent and Peaceful Foreign Relations: 
To establish and maintain diplomatic relations with all 
the countries of the world on the basis of the following 
principles: mutual respect of national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; nonaggression; noninterference in 
internal matters; equal and reciprocal advantages; peaceful 
coexistence. 
Respect for the Charter of the United Nations. 
Nonalignment to whatever military bloc. 
Special relations with our good neighbors and colla-
boration with the surrounding nations of Angola. 
Protection of Angolan residents in foreign countries. 
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POLITICAL GROUPS IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA 
ABAKO Party 
The party of the Bakongo and the X-Belguim Congo 
President, Joseph Kasavubu. Since the Bakongos live in 
Angola to the North as well as the Congo, the leaders of the 
Abako in Angola threaten to establish their own state if the 
Portuguese persist in utilizing the tribal divisions to 
obstruct the demand of independence of the Africans. 
Alianca Zombo (ALIAZO) 
A small tribal group around the village of Maquela 
do Zombo. Also known under the title Alinaca do Naturais of 
Maquela do Zoml::o and Alianca dos Originarios do Zombo. 
Under the leadership of Andre Massaki, the party maintained 
an independent position from the UPA and the MPLA until 
April, 1962, when, after having changed the name (Democratic 
Party of Angola [PDA], the party joined the UPA, which has 
established a provisionary government in exile from Angola. 
Alliance of the Young Angolans for Liberty 
The Secretary-General, Eduardo Makumbi, in October, 
1962, announced a conference (meeting) of the Young Angolans 
to pressure the UPA and the MPLA to unify for the 
"liberation of Angola." 
Association of the Natives of the Enclave of Cabinda 
Founded in 1958 with the purpose of separating 
Cabinda from Angola in order to unite it to the Congo. 
Confederacao das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias 
Portuguesas (CONCP) 
Under the leadership of the MPLA, the CONCP was 
formed by the delegates of the ten parties which met at 
Casablanca April 18-20, 1961. The President is Mario de 
Andrade. The CONCP was established as the committee to co-
ordinate the Portuguese territories, overseeing those who 
were fighting for independence. The CONCP took the place of 
the FRAIN. 
134 
Corpos Voluntario Angolano de Assistencia dos R~f~9i~ 
Organized by the MPLA in June, 1961, in order to 
give medical aid to the refugees from Angola to the Congo. 
Frente Africana Contra o Colonialismo Portugues (FACCP) 
African Front against Portuguese Colonialism. 
Established in 1962, the FACCP was the UPA's response to 
the CONCP. The coalition includes the MLGV of Portuguese 
Guinea and the PDA of Angola, 
Frente Nacional de Libertacao de An9ola (FN~A) 
Formed in April, 1962, the FNLA is the provisionary 
government and the coalition of the UPA and of the PDA or 
the ALIAZO. The leader of the UPA, Holden Roberto, was 
nominated Prime Minister of the provisionary government, and 
Emmanuel Kounzika of the PDA was nominated Vice Prime 
Minister. In July, 1963, the Congolese Premier, Cyrille 
Adoula, recognized the FNLA as the government in exile. 
Frente Revolucionaria Africana para a Independencia das 
Colonias Portuguesas (FRAIN) 
The FRAIN replaced the coalition MAC of the MPLA 
and the PAIGC. It was formed in 1960 after the second ''All 
African" meetings at Tunis and the headquarters were estab-
lished at Conakry, Guinea. The FRAIN was a coalition of 
four movements: the MPLA, the PAIGC, Movement for National 
Independence of Angola, and the Anti-Colony Movement. The 
FRAIN was dissolved with the establishment of the CONCP in 
April, 1961. 
Frente Unida Angolense (FDA) 
Peaceful resistance Movement organized by Socrates 
Cascalos and Fernando Falcao. Composed of Whites, the 
majority born in Angola, it appears that the FDA is supported 
by at least two of the delegates of the National Assembly 
of Angola. In 1962, nine of the members of the FDA were 
deported and imprisoned at Lisbon. 
Liga Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (LGT~) 
Trade Union syndicate that separated from the UPA in 
1962 and joined the Angolan Front of National Liberation. 
The LGTA is under the leadership of Andre Cassinda, a syndi-
cate leader from the South. 
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Liga Nacional Africana (LNA) 
Like the ANANGOLA, the LNA required [demanded] 
several reforms. The LNA was a semi-legal organization 
''assimilated" whose activities were stopped when the leaders 
began to make appeal for the participation of the urban 
masses. It was a forerunner of the MPLA. 
Moviment Anti-Colonista (MAC) 
Nationalist movement which in 1960 joined the FRAIN 
and later was absorbed by the CONCP. The MAC was formed by 
the MPLA and the PAIGC of Portuguese Guinea. The aims were 
"the study of the needs of the Nationalist Organizations"; 
the unity of action among the movements of liberation of the 
Portuguese Colonies; the training of the members as reserves 
for the struggle inside their countries. 
Movimento de Def esa dos Interesses de Angola (MDIA) 
They advocated the collaboration with Portugal after 
the independence of Angola. It was a dissident faction which 
separated from the UPA in order to form the MDIA in January, 
1961. 
Movimento de Libertacao do Enclave de Cabinda (MLEC) 
Founded in 1960 and bound to ethnic groups, it 
appears that the MLEC is under the leadership of descendants 
from African Families which were ennobled by the Portuguese 
King and Queen; their headquarters are at Leopoldville; the 
MLEC does not wish to dissolve into the Congo nor to 
associate with Angola. 
Movimento Popular para a Libertac~o de Angola (MPLA) 
Under the leadership of Agostinko Neto and Mario de 
Andrade, the MPLA is one of the nationalist parties of much 
importance. Established in Leopoldville, it is the rival 
of the UPA. Andrade, Neto, are the African intellectuals 
associated with the movement. In 1956 those men formed the 
MPLA from several clandestine opposition groups. There are 
several differences between the MPLA and the UPA. At first, 
the mulatto leadership of the MPLA increases inter-racial 
cooperation between the Whites and Blacks, whereas the Black 
leadership of the UPA mistrusts the cooperation and fears 
that its position is being undermined by the mulattos' better 
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training. The UPA took a position favoring the Protestants, 
whereas the MPLA was on the Catholic side. The brother of 
Mario de Andrade is a Catholic priest who was imprisoned in 
Portugal. The interior Pan-·African movement, the MPLA, 
took a position for the revolutionary countries: Ghana, 
Guinea, and the United Arab Republic. The UPA, on the other 
hand, was tied to the Reformist nations of Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, and many of the French-speaking African countries. 
Movimento Separatista Ansolana (MSA) 
Founded in June, 1960, this revolutionary movement is 
under the leadership of Carlos Alberto Henriques. 
Movimento Separatista Lusitano (MSL) 
Like the MSA, this group was founded in June, 1960, 
by a white Angolese, Jose Antonio Cabral; the MSL maintains 
contact with the Portuguese exiles in Brazil. 
Ngwizani a Kongo (NGWIZAKO) 
Founded in 1960 with the aim of restoring the old 
tribal monarchy, this group advocated a possible collabora-
tion with Portugal after the independence of Angola. The 
NGWIZAKO is located at Leopoldville. 
Nto-Bako Party (Partido Nto-Bako) 
Protected by the Portuguese, this African party 
opposes the Nationalist Activity in Angola. This party 
assumes the position of spokesman for the Bakongos; its 
leader is Angelion Alberto. 
Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Ansola (PLUA) 
The first revolutionary party that sheltered a 
clandestine activity in Angola. In December, 1956, the 
leader of the PLUA, Viriato da Cruz, joined the Liberation 
of Angola Movement, and the Movement of National Liberation, 
forming the MPLA. 
Partido Comunista Angolano 
Founded in 1955, was accused by the Portuguese to 
have infiltrated the Nationalist, cultural, and religious 
centers at Luanda, Catete, and Malanje. 
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Partido Democratico de An~ola (PDA) 
Formerly the ALIAZO, this party joined the UPA in 
April, 1962, in order to form the provisionary FNLA govern-
ment in Angola. The PDA leader, Errunanuel Kounzika, was made 
vice-prime minister of the new government. 
Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores An~olanos (UNTA) 
Formed in 1954 with headquarters in Leopoldville, 
the UNTA joined the CONCP. 
Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanao (UNEA) 
' 
Formed in 1962, the student movement supports the 
FNLA. It publishes the newspaper, Voz do Estudante An~olano. 
Uniao Social dos Maimbos de Luali 
Apparently this group constitutes the Cabinda section 
of the ABAKO Party. 
Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde 
(PAIGC) 
Under the leadership of Amilcar Cabral and located at 
Conadry, the PAIGC was founded in 1956. Member of the FRAIN, 
formed in 1960, the PAIGC later joined the CONCP. The PAIGC 
maintains friendly relations with the MPLA at Leopoldville. 
The original name of PAIGC is Libertacao. 
Source: Africana Newsletter, Bulletin D'Informations 
Africana, Vol. 1, No. 3, Surruner, 1963, Hoover 
Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, 
California. Editor, Redacteur, Peter Duignan. 
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